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Geopolitik: Haushofer, Hitler and lebensraum

Holger H. Herwig^a

^a Professor of History, University of Calgary

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Geopolitik: Haushofer, Hitler and Lebensraum

HOLGER H. HERWIG

Haushofer was Hitler's intellectual godfather. It was Haushofer, rather than Hess, who wrote Mein Kampf ... Geopolitics was not merely academic theory. It was a driving, dynamic plan for the conquest of the heartland of Eurasia and for domination of the world by the conquest of that heartland ... Really, Hitler was largely only a symbol and a rabble-rousing mouthpiece. The intellectual content of which he was the symbol was the doctrine of Haushofer.

Office of US Chief of Counsel
7 September 1945

Generalmajor Prof. Dr. Karl Haushofer (1869–1946) and his influence on the geopolitical conceptions of Adolf Hitler and the National Socialist regime remain controversial. For much of the non-German world, interpretations have been largely negative, as scholars and statesmen shared the opinions raised in the popular press. *The New Statesman and Nation* on 26 August 1939 depicted the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact as Haushofer's intellectual work. Four months later, the *Daily Express* trumpeted that Haushofer was the 'man who stood behind Hitler's war aims', and claimed that the attack on Poland on 1 September constituted the start of 'Haushofer's war'. The German exile publication *Neue Weltbühne* proclaimed from Paris in January 1940: 'Everything that Hitler has accomplished or wishes to accomplish in the future ... is the program of the geopolitician Karl Haushofer; he thinks, plans and recommends; Hitler repeats and obeys'. In the United States, *Reader's Digest* in November 1941 claimed that Haushofer at Munich maintained an 'Institute for Geopolitics'

with a staff of 1,000 to 'dictate' Hitler's program. *Harpers' Magazine* suggested that the world would never return to 'normalcy' until these 'academics, journalists, and spies' were safely behind bars.¹

Haushofer and his defenders adamantly rejected these charges.² The Professor of Geography, they countered, was simply an academic engaged in wedding geography to history, demography to political science. Haushofer pointed to the fact that he and his family had spent almost three years in incarceration at the hands of the Hitler regime, that his journal *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik* had been closed down by the Nazis, and that his eldest son Albrecht had been murdered by the Gestapo in April 1945.³ Above all, Haushofer informed his American interlocutors in 1945 that his readership had embraced men of moderation and intellect: Weimar Foreign Minister Gustav Stresemann, Austrian Chancellor Ignaz Seipel, French Foreign Minister Aristide Briand, Czechoslovakian President Tomáš Masaryk, and countless other statesmen and intellectuals.⁴

In 1962 the German political scientist Karl Dietrich Bracher in his classic study, *Die nationalsozialistische Machtergreifung*, first attempted to tack a middle course. While pointing out the close relationship between Haushofer, Deputy Führer Rudolf Hess and National Socialist expansionism, Bracher nevertheless rejected as overly simplistic the notion of Haushofer's direct line of influence to Hitler.⁵ And he argued that the topic needed closer scrutiny – beyond the wartime polemics of Robert Strausz-Hupé, Johannes Mattern, Derwent Whittlesey, Andreas Dorpalen, and Sigmund Neumann.⁶

GENESIS OF GEOPOLITICS

Where does the truth lie? The first order of business is to define geopolitics. Haushofer struggled unsuccessfully to come up with a cogent definition; his son Albrecht denied its validity as an academic discipline. The term was first used in its modern sense by the Swedish political scientist Rudolf Kjellén (*Der Staat als Lebensform*), who based his theories in large measure on the German geographer Friedrich Ratzel's *Politische Geographie*.⁸ In 1928 Haushofer posited his 'official' definition of *Geopolitik*: 'the doctrine of the earth relations of political developments ... based on the broad foundations of geography, particularly political geography, as the doctrine of political space organisms and their structure'.⁹ Such offerings tend merely to buttress Mark Twain's pithy comments regarding 'The Awful German Language'. For our purposes, a simple

Webster's dictionary definition will suffice: 'a study of the influence of such factors as geography, economics, and demography on the politics and esp. the foreign policy of a state'.

The basic contours of Haushofer's geopolitics were hardly original. From Ratzel he adopted the notion of space, which Ratzel by 1897 had already defined as *Lebensraum*. A colleague of Karl Haushofer's father, Max, at Munich Polytechnical University, Ratzel tested his theories during long walks with both Haushofers along the banks of the Isar River. He strove to develop political geography as a discipline designed to trace man's evolution over time as it related to his physical geography. Ratzel viewed the state basically as a 'form of the distribution of life on the earth's surface'. The state was 'part man, part soil', given shape and form by the idea of the state. For Ratzel, Charles Darwin's widely misunderstood concept of the 'struggle for survival' came down to 'a struggle for space'. And space was reserved for the victor: 'It is not like the case of the oak, which permits a good deal of weed and grass to grow under its crown. The state cannot tolerate a second or third [state] on its territory if it does not wish to weaken itself.'¹⁰ What Ratzel termed 'bio-geography' fit well into the 1880s and 1890s, when Imperial Germany set out on a course of overseas expansion (*Weltpolitik*) – a 'natural biological development'.

From Kjellén, Haushofer borrowed the term *Autarky*, or national self-sufficiency. For the Swedish Professor at Uppsala, 'state' and 'power' were synonymous. States rose because they were powerful; they maintained their status only if they remained powerful. The state was 'a biological revelation, a living being'. States, especially 'vigorous, vital states with limited space' – read, Germany – were held together by neither laws nor constitutions, but rather by 'the categorical imperative of expanding their space by colonization, amalgamation, or conquest'. Haushofer embraced this social Darwinism, and as early as 1924 developed the notion of 'social aristocracy', that is, rule by the fittest on the basis of natural selection without class or racial exclusivity.¹¹

From Sir Halford Mackinder,¹² Haushofer seized upon the concept of the 'heartland' (a term first used by the British geographer in 1919), whereby the nations of the world were arrayed into two camps – the land power of inner Euro-Asia and the sea power of the maritime states peripheral to the 'heartland'; categorized as 'robbers of the steppe' and 'sea robbers'. Mackinder described the 'heartland' (Russia) thus: 'a continuous land, ice-girt to the north, water-girt elsewhere, measuring 21 million square miles, or more than three times the area of North America'. The periphery consisted of Britain, Canada, the United States, South Africa, Australia, and

Japan. The two spheres eternally were at loggerheads – in Haushofer's view, a continuance in new form of 'the ancient opposition between Roman and Greek'. The real danger to the 'over-sea powers', Mackinder warned his countrymen in 1904, was that Germany might ally itself with the 'pivot state, Russia'. Mackinder defined political power as the product of 'geographical conditions, both economic and strategic', and the 'relative number, virility, equipment, and organization of the competing peoples'.

Finally, from the Pan-German (*Alldeutsch*) movement, Haushofer adopted the idea of 'panregions', beginning with the concept of 'Mitteleuropa' and moving from there to 'Eurafica' – two visions central to Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg's controversial war-aims program of September 1914. Ratzel had been one of the founders of the Pan-German League and instrumental in formulating its demand that the new Germany acquire 'elbow room'.¹³

Haushofer in his writings after 1919 – no fewer than 40 books and about 400 articles, lectures, and reviews – amalgamated the general theories of geopolitics as espoused by Ratzel, Kjellén, and Mackinder, among others. His major contribution was the notion of 'borders' – political boundaries that marked nothing more than the temporary halt of the nation-at-arms en route to territorial expansion. In Haushofer's view, boundaries were living organisms and thus the object of eternal struggles; battle zones in the interplay of greater and lesser powers. 'Everywhere we encounter the frontier as battlefield.' He had no understanding for the static concept of the 'exact border line'; instead, he called for a new sense of a dynamic and ever-changing 'border region'. The latter concept embodied fluidity, uncertainty, instability – the conditions upon which growth and struggle, permanent war and revolution nourished.¹⁴

But were Haushofer's anti-positivist concepts mere academic musings designed to reveal the nature of events past; or were they intended to guide the nation, once liberated from the Versailles *Diktat* of 1919, to a renewed struggle for hegemony? Haushofer's writings were full of contradictions and ambiguity, steeped in nineteenth-century German philosophy and mysticism, nebulosity instead of the rational scientific discipline that he aspired to create. They almost overwhelm by sheer bulk and verbosity.

HAUSHOFER'S CAREER

To understand Haushofer as theorist and activist, officer and professor, journalist and politician, it is necessary to delve into his multifaceted career.

For, Haushofer was formed as much by his environment and activities as by his education and reading. His career spanned German history from the birth of the Second Reich to the Götterdämmerung of the Third. Born at Munich on 27 August 1869, Haushofer died on 10 March 1946. On 8 August 1896 he had married Martha Mayer-Doss, daughter of Georg Ludwig Mayer, a baptized Sephardic Jew.

The military phase of Haushofer's life began in 1887. Frustrated in his ambition to become an artist or architect, Haushofer joined the Royal Bavarian Army. He graduated third in his class at the Prussian War Academy, in 1900 penning a critical analysis of the Battle of Tannenberg (1410) for the then General Count Alfred von Schlieffen, Chief of the General Staff.¹⁵ Seven years later, Haushofer left the Catholic Church when a priest refused to bury his father for the latter's 'earlier liberal political activity'.¹⁶ From 1908 to 1910, Haushofer served as military observer in Japan. He was so impressed by that island nation's rise to great power status that, once back at Munich in 1913, he completed and published a book, *Dai Nihon*¹⁷ (Greater Japan), analyzing early twentieth-century Japan's 'military power potential and future'. The keys to success lay in Japan's 'noble race' (*Edelrasse*), its appreciation of iron leaders, its veneration of the samurai warrior class, and its willingness to use 'just wars' to attain its goals (especially the annexation of Korea in 1910). The book was intended as a counterpoint to Norman Angell's *The Great Illusion* (1909). It led to a major *Leitmotif*: the creation of a grand alliance of Japan, Russia, and Germany to counterbalance the Anglo-Saxon maritime powers.

In 1914 Haushofer penned a second project, 'The German Share in the Geographical Opening-Up of Japan and the Sub-Japanese Earth Space, and its Advancement through the Influence of War and Defence Politics',¹⁸ which he submitted to Munich University for his PhD degree (*summa cum laude*).

A second major influence – indeed, caesura – was the First World War, during which Haushofer served with the Bavarian artillery, rising in rank from major to colonel and taking part in the fighting on both the Eastern and Western Fronts. Haushofer, like Ernst Jünger, another veteran of the Somme, found the 'steel bath' of war to be an uplifting experience, one that substituted comradeship, duty, self-sacrifice, service, and discipline for the chaos of western liberal politics.¹⁹ He attributed the outbreak of the war to 'Slavic arrogance', 'French revanchism', 'British lust for power and wealth' – and 'Austrian half-wittedness' as well as 'neo-German parvenu sins'.²⁰ Haushofer expected the war to last at least three years. He pestered his wife with platitudinal anti-Semitic letters from the front and calls for a German

FIGURE 1



Karl Haushofer, aged 69, entering Eger (Cheb), Bohemia (Czechoslovakia), Sept. 1938 after the Munich Agreement, 'a happy day in the history of geopolitics'.

Bundesarchiv, Koblenz

'Caesar'. Haushofer blamed the Reich's defeat on pacifists, socialists, liberals, and capitalists – thereby following closely the infamous 'stab-in-the-back' legend. As early as 1916, Haushofer determined to dedicate his life to the pursuit of four great ideals: military geography, military history, political geography, and ethnological psychology (*Völkerpsychologie*).²¹ He ended the war in command of 30th Bavarian Reserve Division and quit military service in 1919 with the brevet rank of major general.

Haushofer began his academic career in July 1919 as unsalaried university lecturer in geography at Munich University after having completed an inaugural dissertation (*Habilitationsschrift*) dealing with the 'Basic Contours of the Geographical Development of the Japanese Empire 1854–1919'.²² He was promoted to the rank of honorary professor in March 1921, and full professor in July 1933; on 13 February 1939 he gave his last lecture.

But there was also a darker side to Haushofer's Munich existence: beginning in June 1919, he served in a local anti-republican civil guard (*Einwohnerwehr*) headed by Georg Escherich, and later in the paramilitary organization 'Oberland'. In 1923 Haushofer joined – and a year later became president of – the League for the Preservation of Germandom Abroad (*Verein für die Erhaltung des Deutschtums im Ausland*, or VDA). In this capacity, he maintained close contact with the leaders of the 10 million Germans of the former Austro-Hungarian and German empires living beyond the then borders of their successor states. Politically, Haushofer belonged to the German Peoples' Party until 1925, when he supported Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg for president of the Weimar Republic.

It was through these non-academic ties that Haushofer on 4 April 1919 was introduced to Rudolf Hess. The latter had last served with Fighter Squadron 35 during the Great War. Within a year, Hess became a devoted Haushofer student, attended teas at the Haushofer residence, spent Easter there, and came to be on intimate Christian-name terms (*duzen*) with the professor. Under Haushofer's guidance, Hess – whom the geographer later described as 'a very attentive student' with great 'heart and character' but 'not very intelligent' – in 1922 penned a Munich University prize-winning essay detailing the rise of a new 'Caesar'.²³ In November 1923, after the ill-fated Beer Hall putsch, the Haushofers hid Hess in their Munich residence. When Hess married Inge Pröhl in December 1927, Haushofer and Hitler served as best men. The close ties between Hess and Haushofer would last until the Deputy Führer's bizarre flight to Scotland in May 1941. It was through Hess that Haushofer met Hitler, probably sometime in 1919.

HAUSHOFER AND HITLER

Haushofer's influence on Hitler is difficult to pin down. The two had less than a dozen, mostly public, meetings. Contrary to popular belief, Haushofer did not contribute a word to *Mein Kampf*; he declined to review it in his *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik* as it had 'little to do with geopolitics'.²⁴ Yet the general introduced Hitler to the cream of Munich society, steered Reichswehr personnel to his fledgling movement, and assisted in securing Swiss financial support for Hitler.²⁵ For reasons of 'camouflage', as Haushofer put it in a confidential letter to the Dean of the Faculty of Science at Munich University in December 1938, he had declined to join the National Socialist German Workers' Party (NSDAP) – while nevertheless since 1919 engaged in 'active work' on behalf of the Nazi leadership (Hess, Bormann, Ribbentrop, Rosenberg, Schirach, Todt, etc.).²⁶ Of course, he did have a traceable conduit to the Führer: Hess.

Starting on 24 June and ending with 12 November 1924, Haushofer visited Hess and Hitler in prison at Landsberg on the Lech. The geographer saw the inmates over eight weeks; each visit came on a Wednesday, once in the morning and again in the afternoon.²⁷ Haushofer never commented on why a university professor would take so much time out of a busy schedule to 'educate' what he termed the 'young lions' at Landsberg. Did he perhaps see them already as future practitioners of his geopolitical musings? All we know is that Haushofer regarded Hitler as a potential 'fisher of men'.²⁸

During these 22 hours of mentoring, Haushofer tried to make terms such as Lebensraum, heartland, geopolitics, and especially Ratzel's *Politische Geographie* intelligible to the two men. The general introduced them to Carl von Clausewitz's patriotic writings of February 1812 and his opus *Vom Kriege*. And he had Hitler read *Dai Nihon*, especially Chapter XV detailing a future Japan-Russia-Germany alliance.²⁹ The loss or destruction after 1945 of Hess's notes of these Landsberg sessions precludes a definitive answer to the critical question of how much of Ratzel's and Haushofer's 'bio-geography' and social Darwinism Hess's 'tribune' soaked up.³⁰

Once more, the historical evidence is ambiguous and contradictory. Hitler throughout his life refused to acknowledge any intellectual indebtedness to the Munich geographer; neither the name 'Haushofer' nor the term 'geopolitics' is indexed in his most important writings and monologues.³¹ For Joseph Goebbels and many Nazi insiders, Haushofer remained an obscure 'occulter' and 'subtilizer' (*Spinstisierer*).³² Still, as late as 1940–41 – that is, after he had fallen out of favour with Hitler and leading National Socialists – Haushofer resolutely maintained that Ratzel's opus

had constituted one of the most prized possessions in the inmates' library at Landsberg.³³ Thus, there is no question that Hitler was exposed to the views of Ratzel-Kjellén-Haushofer at Landsberg, and that his amanuensis, Hess, compiled them in *Mein Kampf*. 'These ideas came to Hitler from Hess', Haushofer later stated.³⁴ Hence, they deserve closer scrutiny.


Haushofer's theories, when stripped of all their nuances and philosophical rhetoric, ambiguities and contradictions, can be summarized under five major headings. Two of these stem from geographic theory; two are proposals for global (re)organization; and the last is a facilitating device.³⁵

Haushofer defined *Lebensraum* in practical terms as the right and duty of a nation to provide ample space and resources for its people. Differential increases in population growth among nations guaranteed constant friction in the international power structure; it was thus the duty of the stronger state to expand at the cost of the weaker. This idea was postulated perhaps most graphically in Hans Grimm's wildly popular 1926 novel, *Volk ohne Raum* (265,000 copies sold by 1933). Additionally, Haushofer saw the state as an organism subject not to international but rather to biological laws. Combined, these two concepts encapsulated Ratzel's term 'bio-geography'. To obtain the requisite *Lebensraum*, a state could resort to empire (direct or indirect), peaceful expansion, or, most obviously, 'just wars'. Thus, while in theory the term *Lebensraum* may be geographic and academic, in practice it constituted an operational political-military device. Above all, the attractiveness of the concept – for both its inventors and its practitioners – is that it lent pseudo-scientific character to outright greed and conquest. The term *Lebensraum* appeared twice in the second volume of *Mein Kampf* and 11 times in Hitler's unpublished 'Zweites Buch' of 1928. Haushofer used it already in the first volume of his *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik*, which appeared at the time of Hitler's Munich trial (February–March 1924).³⁶

A second geographical construct, *Autarky*, refers to economic national self-sufficiency. Put differently, a great power has the requirement to produce everything that it needs, leaving the state in economic balance and independent of imports. Certainly, the Allied 'hunger blockade' of Germany in 1914–18 gave credence to the term. Combined, the two geographic theories devolved to Mackinder's notion of the heartland, for without the vast lands of Ukraine and European Russia, and the mineral resources of the Donets basin, the Caucasus, and the Urals-Siberia region, no European power could achieve a state of self-sufficiency.³⁷

In terms of global (re)organization, Haushofer touted the concept of *Panregions* (see Figure 2).³⁸ Put simply: no nation is a region unto itself;

FIGURE 2
HAUSHOFER'S PANREGIONS



Source: Karl Haushofer, *Geopolitik der Pan-Ideen* (Berlin: Zentral 1931).

hence the necessity to extend its area (space) to include first, people of similar speech and culture, and second, people of related speech and culture. The Pan-Germans of the Second Empire spoke long and loud about nature-given German 'cultural' and 'trade' domains. Scattered German settlements of earlier ages had created enclaves of *Deutschtum*, while earlier German traders (Hanseatic League) had established their language as the *lingua franca* in parts of the East. German notions of 'Mitteleuropa' and 'Eurafrica', expounded during the Great War, were manifestations of these demands. But the geopoliticians went further, dividing the globe into three major 'panregions', each combining middle and low latitudes: Pan-America centred around the United States, Pan-Asia with Japan as master, and 'Eurafrica' under eventual German tutelage. A possible fourth 'panregion', the Russia-India combination, awaited future resolution.

Next, Haushofer posited Mackinder's notion of *Land Power vs. Sea Power*. The land mass Eurasia-Africa – by far the largest, most populous, and richest of all possible land combinations – was depicted as the 'pivot' or centre of gravity of all human existence. This heartland alone provided the base sufficient for dominant land power and Autarky. On its western, southern, and eastern fringes lay a crescent of sea powers – marginal lands with ready access to the oceans. The British Isles and the Japanese Archipelago for Haushofer constituted the two greatest sea powers; he would later add to the list what he termed the 'sluggish' American 'eagle'. The lesser Americas, Black Africa, and Australia-New Zealand formed an outer crescent of 'continental islands' to this global geopolitical configuration. Still under the domination of the sea powers, the 'continental islands' could over time come under the mastery of a heartland state with sufficient sea power to overwhelm the inner crescent. In Haushofer's view, a German-Russian combination – the 'pivotal heartland' – might be able, in conjunction with Japan, to control first the inner crescent of British sea power and finally the outer crescent of 'continental islands'.

Haushofer's own contribution to global (re)organization was his concept of fluid and dynamic *Frontiers*. He rejected his era's faith in legal guarantees of borders as well as the concept of 'natural' physical borders and even that of 'biologically correct borders'. Boundaries, Haushofer argued, were mere temporary halts, breathing spells, for a nation on the march to expansion, *Lebensraum*, and Autarky. History was full of examples of nation states that used existing borders as political devices to expand their spheres of influence. Europe, with the most numerous and longest frontiers, historically has been the classic continent of conquest – from ancient Rome to modern Russia.

Embittered over the loss of the First World War, the Versailles *Diktat* ('Volk in Chains'), and Germany's isolation in the 1920s, Haushofer posited these five concepts – Lebensraum, Autarky, Panregions, Land Power vs. Sea Power, and Frontiers – as academic constructs to overcome the Reich's plight. There is no question that many of these constructs, undoubtedly inculcated by the general into the minds of Hitler and Hess in 1924, found their way into Hitler's *Mein Kampf*. A few examples must suffice.

In the section of the first volume of *Mein Kampf*, dictated to Hess at Landsberg in 1924 and entitled 'The Four Ways of German Politics', Hitler drew the lessons of the First World War. Central to these was an understanding of the term 'space' in the nation's future. 'The size of a peoples' living area'. Hitler argued, 'already constitutes an essential factor in determining its external security'. The greater that area, the greater the nation's 'natural protection'. Conversely, the smaller the state, the easier its conquest, 'effectively and more completely'. Thus, the nation's 'liberty and independence' were factors of its political geography.³⁹ Pure Ratzel and Haushofer.

In the section of the second volume, conceptualized with Hess at the Obersalzberg in 1925–26 and entitled 'Eastern Orientation or Eastern Policy', Hitler dealt at length with what he termed the 'geo-military' consequences of this line of reasoning: '*The foreign policy of a völkisch state has to guarantee the existence of the race brought together by the state ... by establishing a viable, natural relationship between the size and growth of the Volk on the one hand, and the expanse and value of the soil and territory on the other.*' Pure Haushofer. Hitler went on: '*A sufficiently extensive area on this globe alone guarantees a Volk its freedom to exist.*' But this area can not be calculated simply on the basis of the present population or immediate needs of a people; rather, '*in addition to that area [being] a source of nourishment for the Volk, there is also its significance in the military-political sphere*'. Thus, apart from guaranteeing its people 'self-sufficiency', the state also must 'secure the territory in hand'.⁴⁰ Pure Kjellén.

In quintessential Haushoferian terminology, Hitler rejected as '*political nonsense*' and a '*crime*' all demands simply to restore Germany to the '*borders of 1914*'. Instead, the future state had the duty to acquire additional '*right to soil and territory*' through conjoint application '*of the plow and the sword*'. In a radicalization of Haushofer's concept of 'borders' as future 'battlefields', Hitler resorted to General Friedrich von Bernhardi's catch word from before the Great War: '*Germany will either become a world power or it will cease to exist.*'⁴¹ Obviously, Hess' 'tribune' had learned his lessons well.

But Haushofer managed to bring his views to a much larger audience than the Landsberg inmates. Beginning in 1919, his geopolitical theories found their way regularly into the *Süddeutsche Monatshefte* – along with articles on the monthly magazines (and Haushofer's) obsession with the 'stab-in-the-back' legend.⁴² By the late 1920s, Haushofer's own *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik* was doing well at the newsstands, selling between 300,000 and 500,000 copies annually, and thus spreading his message of national mass claustrophobia.⁴³ Additionally, the general's comments reverberated throughout the land in other national and regional newspapers such as the *Deutsche Rundschau*, *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, *Frankfurter Zeitung*, *Schwäbische Merkur*, and a host of regional papers. At another level, Haushofer's arguments concerning Germany's 'just' claims to Lebensraum as well as his 'blood and soil' terminology found their way into elementary and middle-school geography and history textbooks for students and into handbooks for teachers.⁴⁴ In 1929 German university students, at their annual meeting at Hanover, with the support of faculty petitioned the Ministry of Culture to establish university chairs in Popular National Studies (*Volkstumskunde*) and Geopolitics.⁴⁵

Haushofer's greatest influence perhaps came through his clever use of the radio: beginning in 1924, the geographer reached at least a portion of the three million German homes with radios by means of his monthly broadcasts on the Deutsche Welle and the Bayerischer Rundfunk, among other senders, on politics and geopolitics.⁴⁶ His message was consistent and constant: Germans could only begin to work towards national revival if they taught themselves to think 'geopolitically' and to insist upon Germany's 'eternal and indestructible geopolitical power base'.⁴⁷ Through these activities, Haushofer's private income from 1927 to 1933 amounted to between 30,000 and 60,000 Marks per annum; after Hitler's accession to power, that amount soared to between 120,000 and 200,000 Marks – at a time when a skilled railroad worker earned 2,000 Marks a year.⁴⁸

The Nazis would avail themselves of his cabalistic catchwords in the 1930s with regard to expansionism: 'Volk renewal', 'rule by the fit', 'goals of expansionism', 'soil mastery', 'organic frontiers', 'struggle for power', 'space struggle', 'willingness to sacrifice with thousands of martyrs', and the like. Thus, while it may not be possible to trace a direct link between Haushofer's theories and the general staff, the foreign office, or the government, it is nevertheless incontrovertible that his geopolitical theories were in wide circulation throughout the 1920s. With regard to Hitler, Haushofer played a clever game: publicly he kept his distance from the

radical 'tribune'; privately, via Hess he fed Hitler his peculiar world view (*Weltbild*) on space, race, and 'just wars'.

HAUSHOFER AND NATIONAL SOCIALISM

The political phase of Haushofer's career began with the Nazi accession to power in 1933. In truth, the geographer shared – indeed, helped create – many of the beliefs espoused by Hitler. In his published 'Monthly Reports' of the 1920s, Haushofer had stated that Germany once again was 'encircled' by a ring of hostile powers, by a new 'entente' consisting of France, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. He had opposed all attempts by Weimar statesmen to break out of this isolation and to ameliorate by negotiation the Versailles *Diktat*. Specifically, Haushofer had rejected the 'spirit of Locarno', the Dawes Plan, and the League of Nations as further manifestations of Germany's ongoing subjugation. He had no qualms about the first three points of the NSDAP (Nazi Party) program of 24 February 1920: union of all Germans into a Greater Germany under the motto of self-determination; equality of Germans with other peoples and revocation of the treaties of Versailles and St Germain; and 'territory and soil' for the feeding of the German nation and the settlement of its excess population. Haushofer proved quite willing to couch his views in racial terms familiar to any Nazi.

It is fair to place Haushofer squarely within the camp of the anti-democratic, anti-republican, anti-socialist, and anti-Semitic neo-conservatives such as Moller van den Bruck, Ernst Jünger, Carl Schmitt, and Oswald Spengler – men who laid the intellectual foundations for National Socialism. But unlike many of his fellow travelers, who rejected what they perceived to be the vulgar, herd-like mentality of the Nazis, Haushofer after 1933 lauded Hitler and Hess as men of peace and common sense. And he placed his journalistic abilities at the service of the new order, preaching the gospel of geopolitics to the German public through countless newspaper articles and radio broadcasts.

Haushofer's *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik* was in vogue after 1933, reaching an annual circulation of almost 700,000 copies. And the general found new venues to spread his message. When the giant Ullstein publishing empire was bought by the NSDAP's press chief, Max Amann, in 1934, Haushofer was appointed to the firm's new editorial board. Therewith, he had direct and insider access to more than six influential newspapers, including the *Berliner Morgenpost* (500,000 circulation), *B-Z am Mittag* (200,000), *Berliner Illustrierte* (2 million), the venerable *Vossische Zeitung* (500,000),

and the weeklies *Montagspost* (500,000) and *Grüne Post* (1 million).⁴⁹ Obviously, Haushofer was well placed to influence both the public and the party with his views; the NSDAP hailed him as the ‘educator of the Volk’.

But Haushofer, then 65 years old, also played a more direct and official role in the Third Reich – his later ‘Apologia’ that he had done everything after 1933 ‘under pressure’⁵⁰ notwithstanding. In October 1933 he accepted Hess’ invitation to head the *Volksdeutscher Rat*, an advisory council designed to promote the cause of Germans abroad – thereby formalizing his former role as president of the VDA. In May 1934, again on Hess’ initiative, Haushofer was appointed to the Deputy Führer’s staff to help plan the so-called ‘Reichsreform’, whereby the division of Germany into historic *Gaue* was to be accelerated and expanded. While most reformers thought only in terms of traditional ‘cultural’ or ‘economic’ divisions, Haushofer immediately seized upon ‘Reichsreform’ to realize his pet scheme of using political borders as a vehicle to attract and eventually to incorporate former German lands into the Reich.

Specifically, Haushofer, deploying the language of his military career, argued that the state should create as many border *Gaue* as possible; and to use these ‘security districts’ (*Abwehrgaue*), supported in-depth by ‘core districts’ (*Kerngaue*), as ‘permanent warlike troublemakers’ against especially Poland and Czechoslovakia.⁵¹ From 1934 to 1937, Haushofer served as President of the German Academy (for the preservation and protection of German history and language), a pale copy of the Académie française. Therewith, he operated within some of the leading organizations of the Third Reich – in effect partly attaining his ambition of quietly operating as ‘king maker’. After 1945, Haushofer would deny that he ever played such a role.

Yet again, the question: where does the truth lie? And yet again: the answer is both ambiguous and contradictory. On the surface, there were numerous indications that Haushofer belonged to the favoured few in the new order.⁵² In August 1933 he received from Hess a special letter of protection (*Schutzbrief*) to permit his ‘1/4 Jewish sons’ to pursue their state careers. The following month, Haushofer became a ‘patron’ of the SS-Sturmabteilung I, 1. SS-Standarte Munich. In 1935 Hess again came to the rescue of his former mentor. First, he issued Haushofer a letter of protection to exempt the general’s ‘non-Aryan’ wife from the infamous Nürnberg Racial Laws; and then he exempted Haushofer from having to sign a ‘racial purity form’ with Radio Munich, arguing that the broadcasts were ‘in Germany’s national interest’.⁵³

In return, Haushofer that same year placed his intimate contacts to the

Japanese (Ambassador Kintomo Mushakoji, Military Attaché Major General Hiroshi Oshima, and Prince Tsunenori Kaya) at Hitler's service to bring about the formation of the Anti-Comintern Pact. As well, Haushofer had joined the Academy of German Law, the NS Union of Teachers, and the NS Union of Professors; had taught at the NS Union of Students and the NSDAP Commission of Examiners; and had spoken regularly to Strength Through Joy and German Labour Front groups as well as to army cadres.⁵⁴

In truth, Haushofer basked in the glory of Hitler's early triumphs. He supported Hitler leaving the League of Nations, remilitarizing the Rhineland, introducing rearmament and conscription, and secretly testing weapons systems in the Soviet Union (the 'Black Reichswehr'). In March 1936 Haushofer in the *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik* reminded Germans of their 'duty to race and Volk' and called on them to 'trust the Führer' and to aspire to Lebensraum ('continents and oceans') 'by way of the Führer'.⁵⁵ In September 1938 the general met with Hitler and Hermann Göring during the Munich Conference, at which his son Albrecht served as an expert on geography – a clear indication that both Haushofers on occasion had direct access to Hitler's decision-making process. Karl Haushofer celebrated the Munich Agreement as 'a happy day in the history of geopolitics', the result of the Führer's 'geopolitical mastery'.⁵⁶ He could not help but revel in the fact that Hitler thereby laid the groundwork for 'the Central European solution in its Germanic form': the eventual return of the 'ancient imperial lands of Bohemia and Moravia into the heart of the Reich'.⁵⁷ In the wake of the Crystal Night pogrom in November 1938, Hess for a third time issued the Haushofers a *Schutzbrief*. Meetings with Hitler and his inner circle took place in March 1933, September and November 1937, April and November 1938, and finally February 1939. In the words of his official biographer, Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, Haushofer had become the 'cultured advertising executive for the Third Reich'.⁵⁸

Throughout 1933 to 1941, Haushofer met almost monthly with Hess. The Deputy Führer was always able to 'clear up' Haushofer's concerns with the less savoury side of the new order. At other times, Haushofer merely suppressed such concerns or rationalized their obviously 'fleeting' existence. In July 1934, for example, Haushofer congratulated Hess on the mass murders of Ernst Röhm and 89 others in the so-called 'night of the long knives'.⁵⁹ Above all, Haushofer was awestruck by the military might and pageantry of the Hitler state as well as by its ability to rally the masses in an organized and disciplined manner. On 20 April 1939, Hitler's 50th birthday, Haushofer celebrated the Führer as a 'statesman' who combined in his person 'Clausewitz's blood and Ratzel's space and soil'.⁶⁰ The following

month, Haushofer revealed about his work 'behind the scenes' over the past two years with regard to 'the events of 1938/39', that is, the breakup of the Czechoslovakian state and the Austrian *Anschluss*.⁶¹ As late as the summer of 1940, the general still raved about Hitler and Hess as men guided by the 'highest human principles' – at a time when Haushofer already knew of the Nazi policy of murder and extermination in Poland as well as of the first transports of west European Jews to points east.

In 1945 Haushofer assured his American interrogators that he had played no role in Hitler's road to war; indeed, that Hitler had operated specifically in contradiction to his *Weltbild*. The record suggests otherwise. Haushofer celebrated the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of August 1939 as a blow against the 'anaconda policy' of the 'western Jewish plutocracy'.⁶² The general's dream, as first enunciated in *Dai Nihon* in 1913, of a Japan-Russia-Germany alliance against the Anglo-Saxon sea powers was at last reality. He rushed to print with a new book lauding Hitler's brilliant 'Eurasian' vision. 'The creation of a powerful continental block embracing Europe, North and East Asia, undoubtedly is the greatest and most important world-political turning-point of our time.'⁶³ The dreams of Landsberg 1924 had been translated into flesh and blood.

Haushofer interpreted Hitler's destruction of Poland in September 1939 – 'a heroic stroke of seldom attained greatness' – as the conquest of hitherto 'dead space' by way of a new symbiosis of ancient 'blood and soil' in the 'Vistula region'.⁶⁴ In a personal letter to Hess, Haushofer waxed nostalgic. 'Now the axis from the North Sea to the Pacific has been created ... How many times did we in our most audacious dreams conjure up world-political visages of space as have now been realized! It is a shame to be 70 years old and to be able to serve only as a cultural-political umbrella from behind the scenes.' In the wake of the Poland campaign, Haushofer sent Hess a detailed plan for the 'resettling of Baltic Germans'.⁶⁵ And the veteran of the Great War was mesmerized by Hitler's crushing defeat of France. On 22 June 1940 Haushofer in a personal letter to Hess reiterated Hitler's claim that German history had been radically altered for the next thousand years, and that 'the world holds its breath as once during the coronation of Charlemagne'.

Then Haushofer added his own laudation: the 'staging in the forest of Compiègne' had taken the world 'by storm'; the time was already at hand to plan 'yours and the Führer's place in Valhalla'. All that remained was to implement Haushofer's own version of the doctrine of 'freedom of the seas': 'racial enhancement', 'disarmament of the blacks', and 'return of our colonies', all by way of 'Europe's war of liberation against the piracy and

domination of Anglo chains'.⁶⁶ Unbeknown to Haushofer, Hitler in September 1940 for a brief moment toyed with the general's grand design – a firm 'tripartite pact' among Japan, Russia, and Germany – by combining the Hitler-Stalin pact of August 1939 with the Three-Power Pact of September 1940 into a grand geopolitical constellation.⁶⁷ When the Führer opted for Japan and against the Soviet Union, Haushofer saw that tie to Tokyo as the direct result of 'thirty years of work on my part'.⁶⁸

On the other side of the coin, Haushofer's relations with the new order were beset with problems. As early as March 1933, party officials had searched his residence in Munich, allegedly for 'concealed weapons'. The need for three special letters of protection from Hess attests to Haushofer's constant fears of state reprisals against his 'non-Aryan' wife. By 1939, Haushofer's book on borders (*Grenzen*) was banned in Germany as a result of Benito Mussolini's protest against the general's support of 'Germandom abroad', in the South Tyrol. In November 1940 the Hitler regime obstructed Haushofer's plans for a new book on Japan, seeing therein an infringement upon official policy. With Hess's flight to Scotland, Haushofer was left without a patron: he was arrested and questioned by the Gestapo in May 1941; Hitler railed against what he called the 'Jewish' professor and regretted that he had not earlier 'silenced' the entire 'Munich brood'.⁶⁹ Albrecht Haushofer's knowledge about the attempt on Hitler's life in July 1944 brought about for his father first a house search and then arrest and incarceration at Dachau Concentration Camp from 28 July to 31 August. In October 1944 Haushofer's Munich residence was again searched by Gestapo agents. In the final analysis, Haushofer had misjudged the revolutionary and criminal nature of Hess' 'tribune' – as well as the power of his patron. It never occurred to Haushofer to join the small circle of opposition to Hitler.

To be sure, there were significant differences of opinion between Haushofer and Hitler. First, and most obviously, there was the issue of racism. At the personal level, Haushofer could never quite trust the Nazis with regard to what he termed 'the only really great piece of good fortune of my life',⁷⁰ his wife Martha, due to her 'Jewish blood'. Thus he feared point four of the 1920 NSDAP program, which stated that only a person of 'undiluted German blood' could become a *Volksgenosse*. As well, he rejected race as the major determinant of history; to have done so would have been a negation of his life's work in political geography. Conversely, for the Nazis, Haushofer's 'space' concepts left too little room for their insistence on the decisive influence of biological-racial factors upon history. In the end, while Haushofer clamoured for the construction of a Greater

Germany that included all ethnic Germans as well as former German 'cultural' lands and 'trade' domains, and did so using the vocabulary of the Nazis, the latter saw such a 'Greater German Reich' as but a stage on the road to a more radical 'reordering of the European continent' along racial-biological lines.

And there was the matter of the Soviet Union. While Haushofer later claimed that Hitler's invasion of the Russian heartland on 22 June 1941 had constituted a radical break with his *Weltbild*,⁷¹ the general's published comments on Operation 'Barbarossa' do not support that claim. In July 1941 he informed his readers that 'Barbarossa' constituted 'the greatest task of geopolitics, the rejuvenation of space in the Old World'. Haushofer saw the invasion of the Soviet Union as the Führer's bold attempt 'positively and creatively' to turn the task of forging 'Eurasia and Eurafrika into reality'. Already looking beyond the anticipated victory of the NS-ideology over Communism, the general gave his geopolitical emotions free rein: 'Thereafter, a veritable cornucopia of space-related, economic and geopolitical tasks will be showered down on Eurasia', one whose vast dimensions not even the guardians of the new order 'can fully fathom'.⁷²

Thus, Hitler's invasion of the 'pivot' of history was not at all in violation of all that the general had preached since his *Dai Nihon* book of 1913. Only the means of creating a Japan-Russia-Germany heartland poised to tackle the sea power of the inner crescent had changed – from alliance to conquest. To be sure, by 1941 Haushofer's theoretical geopolitical constructs had long been drowned out by Hitler's ever-escalating pace of diplomatic crises, war, and extermination. But the general remained true to his convictions to the bitter end: after the Battle of Stalingrad, he penned for Hitler a shopping list of German war aims that included the annexation of Poland, Bohemia, Moravia, Slovenia, Alsace-Lorraine, Eupen-Malmédy, North Schleswig, South Tyrol, Togoland, and the Cameroons; 'friendly' regimes in Finland, the Baltic states, Slovakia, Croatia, Serbia, Greece, Belorussia, and the Ukraine; and a German-dominated 'economic union' with Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and Italy.⁷³ Geopolitics 'Through the Looking Glass'.

NEMESIS

At war's end, Karl Haushofer feared arrest by the Americans or murder by the Russians. In November 1945 American occupation authorities rescinded Haushofer's university lectureship as well as honorary professorship and

confiscated his library. On 10 March 1946 Heinz Haushofer, the younger son, arrived at the family estate near Pähl, Bavaria, to pick up his mother. He discovered her body hanging from a tree, and that of his father beneath another tree; both had taken arsenic. In a terse suicide note, Karl Haushofer decreed that he wished 'no form of state or church funeral, no obituary, epitaph, or identification of my grave'. He closed more than half a century of service as officer, academic, publicist, and political adviser with the words: 'I want to be forgotten and forgotten.'⁷⁴

Haushofer never issued an order to go to war, never killed a Jew, never transported a slave labourer, never arrested a fellow citizen. Near the end of his life, he maintained that he had always acted in good faith according to the maxim of two of his peers, Sir Thomas Holditch and Sir Halford Mackinder: 'Let us educate our masters.'⁷⁵ His major regret was that the Nazis – with the 'half-educated' Hitler and Hess at their head – had never understood his geopolitical theories.⁷⁶

Haushofer's cardinal sin – beyond that shared by so many German academics, of openly opposing the democratic, parliamentary Weimar Republic – was that he paved the way intellectually for much of the Nazi terminology of expansionism. From the Olympian heights of Munich University as well as through hundreds of newspaper articles and countless hours of radio broadcasts, he first provided their slogans and then popularized these under the guise of 'scientific research'. By way of his august standing as a former Great War veteran and academic mandarin, Haushofer gave credence and respect to what in Hitler's mind and from his pen became the vulgar doctrines of Lebensraum, 'bio-geography', Autarky, eternal struggle, and permanent revolution. In a sense obviously not appreciated by Haushofer, the general had, indeed, 'educated' his 'masters'.

Haushofer's biographer, Jacobsen, concluded that the geopolitician had made National Socialist expansionism palatable to the broad public, indirectly blessed its course of aggression and conquest, and directly contributed to 'the moral seduction of the German Volk'.⁷⁷ Albrecht Haushofer from Moabit prison shortly before his murder in March 1945 acknowledged Karl's critical role under the Nazi regime in a sonnet entitled 'My Father': 'But my father broke away the seal ... He let the daemon soar into the world.' Albrecht concluded in another sonnet, 'My father was blinded still by the dream of power.'⁷⁸ With the accuracy of historical hindsight, geopolitics may well have been 'the greatest hoax of the century',⁷⁹ yet it was serious business first for Karl Haushofer, and then in Nazi Germany.

The historian Dennis E. Showalter has argued with regard to the

influence of Julius Streicher and his racist-pornographic publication, *Der Stürmer*, that popular writers must be judged by their paper's circulation and influence. Publication means recognition and influence. It mobilizes frustrations and hostilities. It can play a direct instrumental role in shaping the future. And it can translate into acceptance of the author's views and the implied possibility of solutions to real or imagined problems within the framework of a new order.⁸⁰ Streicher was tried at Nürnberg and hanged for these sins.

In the final analysis, Haushofer provides a fascinating study of a central character of modern German history as defined by the novelist Thomas Mann: *General Dr. von Staat*. For, Haushofer combined in his person three pivotal careers: military officer (1887–1919), university professor (1921–39), and advisor and confidante to Deputy Führer Rudolf Hess (1920–41). In many ways, the general's suicide in 1946 personified the end of a particularly complex and tragic phase of his nation's history.

NOTES

1. Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, *Karl Haushofer: Leben und Werk* [Schriften des Bundesarchivs 24] (2 vols., Boppard: Harald Boldt 1979) Vol.1, pp.409–12, 568–69. All original Haushofer documents stem from the Nachlass (N 122) at the Bundesarchiv (BA), Koblenz; the latter also contains copies of the Haushofer materials (T 253) at the National Archives, Washington DC, as well as of the Institut für Zeitgeschichte, Munich, as ED 98 Nachlass Haushofer, MA-162, MA 618-19, MA 1190, and MA 1464-66. Jacobsen culled from the Haushofer Nachlass all materials that he used in his two-volume biography and hence much of this is in the Nachlass Jacobsen (N 413) rather than N 122 at Koblenz. Finally, there is a private Haushofer family archive at the Hartschimmelhof near Pähl, Bavaria. My various attempts to see this material were met with silence, my letters returned unopened.
2. For a most recent apologia, see Frank Ebeling, 'Karl Haushofer und die deutsche Geopolitik 1919–1945', unpub. diss., Hanover 1992.
3. See Haushofer's Nov. 1945 'Apologie der deutschen Geopolitik' in BA, N 413, Vol.2.
4. Statement of 2 Nov. 1945. BA, N 413, Vol.6.
5. Karl Dietrich Bracher, et al., *Die nationalsozialistische Machtergreifung. Studien zur Errichtung des totalitären Herrschaftsystems in Deutschland 1933/34* (Cologne and Opladen: Westdeutscher 1962) p.226.
6. Robert Srausz-Hupé, *Geopolitics: The Struggle for Space and Power* (NY: Putnam's 1942); Johannes Mattern, *Geopolitik: Doctrine of National Self-Sufficiency and Empire* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press 1942); Derwent Whittlesey, *German Strategy of World Conquest* (NY and Toronto: Farrar & Rinehart 1942); Andreas Dorpalen, *The World of General Haushofer: Geopolitics in Action* (Port Washington, NY: Kennikat 1942); and Sigmund Neumann, *Permanent Revolution: The Total State in a World at War* (NY and London: Harper 1941).
7. Rudolf Kjellén, *Der Staat als Lebensform*, German ed. (Leipzig: S. Hirzel 1917); in Swedish, *Staten som Lifsform* (Stockholm 1916). Kjellén lived 1864–1922.
8. Friedrich Ratzel, *Politische Geographie* (Munich and Leipzig: R. Oldenbourg 1897). Ratzel lived 1844–1904.
9. Karl Haushofer et al., *Bausteine zur Geopolitik* (Berlin: K. Vowinckel 1928) pp.23–4. Already in the summer of 1916, after his first reading of Kjellén, Haushofer vowed to find a

- German term for geopolitics; he failed, rejecting even his own best effort, *Erdmachtkunde*.
10. Ratzel (note 8) p.7.
 11. Karl Haushofer, 'Nationaler Sozialismus und soziale Aristokratie', *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik* 1 (1924) pp.127ff.
 12. Halford J. Mackinder, 'The Geographical Pivot of History', *The Geographical Journal* 23 (April 1904) pp.421–44. See also Paul M. Kennedy, 'Mahan versus Mackinder: Two Interpretations of British Sea Power', *Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen* (1974) pp.39–66.
 13. *Alldeutsche Blätter* 4, 7 Jan. 1894.
 14. Karl Haushofer, *Grenzen in ihrer geographischen und politischen Bedeutung* (Berlin and Heidelberg: K. Vowinkel 1927 and 1939).
 15. BA, N 413, Vol.1.
 16. *Ibid*.
 17. Karl Haushofer, *Dai Nihon. Betrachtungen über Groß-Japans Wehrkraft und Zukunft* (Berlin: E.S. Mittler 1913).
 18. Karl Haushofer, 'Der deutsche Anteil an der geographischen Erschließung Japans und des subjapanischen Erdrums und deren Förderung durch den Einfluß von Krieg und Wehrpolitik', Munich Univ. diss. 1914.
 19. Letter to his wife, 4 Feb. 1915; Jacobsen (note 1) Vol.1, p.121.
 20. Letter to his wife, 6 July 1917; *ibid*. p.128.
 21. Letter to his wife, 8 May 1916; *ibid*. p.124.
 22. Karl Haushofer, *Grundrichtungen in der geographischen Entwicklung des Japanischen Reiches 1854–1919*, special *Habilitationsschrift* publication (Munich: Bieler 1919).
 23. The essay is reproduced in Bruno Hipler, *Hitlers Lehrmeister. Karl Haushofer als Vater der NS-Ideologie* (Erzabtei St Ottilien: EOS 1996) pp.221–6. Haushofer's description of Hess is from the 5 Oct. 1945 interrogation by the US Army. BA, N 413, Vol.1.
 24. See the Nov. 1945 'Apologie' in BA, N 413, Vol.2.
 25. See Willi Gautschi's report in the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, Vol.199, Fernausgabe Nr. 302, 30 Dec. 1978, pp.23–4.
 26. Letter of 24 Dec. 1938. BA, N 413, Vol.5.
 27. Strangely, the dates of these visits have been scissored out of the letter, Justice Department Landsberg to Jacobsen, 24 Aug. 1971. BA, N 413, vol. 2.
 28. *Statement* of 1925. BA, N 122, Vol.955b.
 29. Haushofer deposition of 22 Sept. 1945, US Third Army Intelligence Center. BA, N 413, Vol.2. See also Wolf Rüdiger Hess (ed.) *Rudolf Hess. Briefe 1908–1933* (Munich and Vienna: Langen Müller 1987) p.328. 'He [Hitler] is at the moment reading the general's Japan books ...'.
 30. Jacobsen (note 1) Vol.1, p.241. The notes were last known to be deposited with the Bayerische Hypotheken- und Wechselbank at Munich in 1945.
 31. See Adolf Hitler, *Mein Kampf* (Munich: Zentralverlag der NSDAP, Frz. Eher Nachf. 1939); Werner Jochmann (ed.) *Adolf Hitler. Monologe im Führer-Hauptquartier 1941–1944* (Munich: Wilhelm Heyne 1980); and Gerhard L. Weinberg (ed.) *Hitlers Zweites Buch. Ein Dokument aus dem Jahr 1928* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt 1961). Hermann Rauschnig, *Hitler Speaks: A Series of Political Conversations with Adolf Hitler on his Real Aims* (London: Thornton Butterworth 1939) p.226, states simply: 'Hitler recognised no predecessors – with one exception: Richard Wagner.'
 32. Elke Fröhlich (ed.) *Die Tagebücher Joseph Goebbels. Sämtliche Fragmente* 4 (Munich: K. G. Saur 1987) p.727.
 33. See Friedrich Ratzel, *Erdenmacht und Völkerschicksal. Eine Auswahl aus seinen Werken* (ed.) Karl Haushofer (Stuttgart: A. Kröner 1940) p.xxvi.
 34. Deposition of 22 Sept. 1945. BA, N 413, Vol.2.
 35. See Derwent Whittlesey, 'Haushofer: The Geopoliticians', in Edward Mead Earle (ed.) *Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler* (Princeton UP 1943) pp.398–406. The article was dropped from the major rewrite of the volume by Peter Paret in 1986.
 36. Karl Lange, 'Der Terminus "Lebensraum" in Hitlers "Mein Kampf"', *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 13 (Oct. 1965) pp.427, 431.

37. Haushofer consistently acknowledged his intellectual debt to Mackinder. See James Trapier Lowe, *Geopolitics and War: Mackinder's Philosophy of Power* (Washington DC: UP of America 1981) pp.86–7.
38. Karl Haushofer, *Geopolitik der Pan-Ideen* (Berlin: Zentral 1931).
39. Hitler, *Mein Kampf* (note 31) p.142.
40. *Ibid.* pp.638–9. Italics in the original.
41. *Ibid.* pp.645, 650, 651–2. Italics in the original. The Haushoferian view on borders in general and especially against merely reconstituting those of 1914 was also repeated by Hitler in the *Zweites Buch*, p.114. Yet it would overstretch the evidence to suggest that *Dai Nihon* and *Mein Kampf* were cast from the same mould: Hitler (note 31) pp.178ff.
42. Harry Pross, *Literatur und Politik. Geschichte und Programme der politisch-literarischen Zeitschriften im deutschen Sprachgebiet seit 1870* (Olten and Freiburg: Walter 1963) p.113.
43. See Karl-Heinz Harbeck, 'Die "Zeitschrift für Geopolitik" 1924–1944', unpubl. diss., Kiel University 1963, pp.257–64.
44. David Thomas Murphy, *The Heroic Earth: Geopolitical Thought in Weimar Germany 1918–1933* (Kent, OH and London: Kent State UP 1997) p.242.
45. Kurt Sontheimer, *Antidemokratisches Denken in der Weimarer Republik. Die politischen Ideen des deutschen Nationalismus zwischen 1918 und 1933* (Munich: Nymphenburger Verlagshandlung 1962) p.312.
46. Murphy (note 44) pp.106–8.
47. Cited in *ibid.* p.28.
48. BA, N 413, Vol.1. 'Finanzen'; Gerhard Bry, *Wages in Germany 1871–1945* (Princeton UP 1960), pp.439 ff.
49. Oron J. Hale, *The Captive Press in the Third Reich* (Princeton UP 1964) pp.131–2.
50. Haushofer's statement of 2 Nov. 1945. BA, N 413, vol. 6.
51. Bracher (note 5) pp.609–11.
52. The following is compiled from Jacobsen (note 1) Vol.1. See also Donald Hawley Norton, 'Karl Haushofer and His Influence on Nazi Ideology and German Foreign Policy, 1919–1945', unpubl. diss., Clark Univ., Worcester, MA, USA 1965.
53. Hess to Radio Munich, 9 Feb. 1935. BA, N 413, Vol.5.
54. Rainer Matern, 'Karl Haushofer und seine Geopolitik in den Jahren der Weimarer Republik und des Dritten Reiches. Ein Beitrag zum Verständnis seiner Ideen und seines Wirkens', unpubl. diss., Karlsruhe Univ. 1978, pp.143–4.
55. 'Stimme der Geopolitik zum 29. März 1936', *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik* 13 (1936) p.247.
56. 'Geopolitischer Erntedank 1938!', *ibid.* 15 (Oct. 1938) p.782.
57. Jacobsen (note 31) Vol.1, p.372.
58. Hipler (note 23), p.173.
59. Haushofer to Hess, 1 July 1934, in Jacobsen (note 1) Vol.1, pp.377–8.
60. *Ibid.* pp.370–71.
61. Haushofer to Hess' staff, 17 May 1939. BA, N 122, Vol.23.
62. 'Herbsten?', *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik* 16 (Oct. 1939) p.741.
63. Karl Haushofer, *Der Kontinentalblock. Mitteleuropa-Eurasien-Japan* (Munich: F. Eher Nachf. 1941).
64. Haushofer to Hess, 20 Oct. 1939. BA, N 122, Vol.15; and 'Geopolitische Grundlagen', *Die Verwaltungs-Akademie. Ein Handbuch für den Beamten im nationalsozialistischen Staat* (Berlin and Vienna: Deutscher n.d. [1940]) Vol.1, p.40.
65. BA, N 122, Vol.15, Jan. 1940; Jacobsen (note 1) Vol. 1, p.394.
66. Haushofer to Hess, 22 June 1940. BA, N 122, Vol.15.
67. See Andreas Hillgruber, *Hitlers Strategie. Politik und Kriegführung 1940–1941* (Frankfurt: Bernard & Graefe 1965) p.241.
68. Haushofer to Hess, 27 Sept. 1940. BA, N 122, Vol.23.
69. Gerhard Engel, *Heeresadjutant bei Hitler 1938–1943. Aufzeichnungen des Majors Engel* (ed.) Hildegard v. Kotze (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt 1974) p.105.
70. Suicide note cited in Jacobsen (note 1) Vol.1, p.447.
71. *Ibid.* pp.460–61.
72. Karl Haushofer, 'Die größte Aufgabe', *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik* 18 (July 1941) pp.369–70.

73. 'Gedanken zur Friedensordnung', BA, N 122, Vol.832.
74. Cited in Jacobsen (note 1) Vol.I, p.447.
75. Ibid. p.343.
76. Edmund A. Walsh, 'Die Tragödie Karl Haushofers', *Neue Auslese aus dem Schrifttum der Gegenwart 2* (March 1947) p.22.
77. Jacobsen (note 1) Vol.I, p.389.
78. Albrecht Haushofer, *Moabit Sonnets* (London and NY: Norton 1978) pp.49, 77.
79. Edmund A. Walsh, *Total Power: A Footnote to History* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday 1948) p.7.
80. Dennis E. Showalter, *Little Man, What Now? Der Stürmer in the Weimar Republic* (Hamden, CT: Archon Books 1982) p.236.