

This article was downloaded by: [Universitaetsbibliothek Marburg]

On: 13 March 2012, At: 13:10

Publisher: Routledge

Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK



Geopolitics

Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:

<http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fgeo20>

Geopolitics, International Relations and Political Geography: The Politics of Geopolitical Discourse

Virginie Mamadouh^a & Gertjan Dijkink^a

^a AMIDSt, Department of Geography, Planning and International Development Studies, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands

Available online: 23 Nov 2006

To cite this article: Virginie Mamadouh & Gertjan Dijkink (2006): Geopolitics, International Relations and Political Geography: The Politics of Geopolitical Discourse, *Geopolitics*, 11:3, 349-366

To link to this article: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14650040600767859>

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Full terms and conditions of use: <http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions>

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden.

The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae, and drug doses should be independently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand, or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.

**INTRODUCTION TO SPECIAL ISSUE OF *GEOPOLITICS*:
*THE POLITICS OF GEOPOLITICAL DISCOURSE***

**Geopolitics, International Relations and
Political Geography: The Politics of
Geopolitical Discourse**

VIRGINIE MAMADOUH and GERTJAN DIJKINK

*AMIDSt, Department of Geography, Planning and International Development Studies,
University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands*

It is a hazardous business to introduce research on geopolitical discourses in a journal called *Geopolitics*. For the past decade most of the work done on geopolitics – in geography at least – deals with discourses, codes, visions, representations, narratives, and other concepts pertaining to the importance of language in geopolitical practices. The articles in this special issue analyse geopolitical discourses in relation to (domestic) political processes of struggles and the shifting framework of national and international power. We have dubbed this common theme ‘the politics of geopolitical discourse’.

In this introduction we aimed at disclosing three political dimensions of geopolitics. The first concerns the political character of geopolitical knowledge, the possibility of a geopolitical body of knowledge beyond everyday politics and the necessity and danger of political engagement of scholars in that field. The second is the academic politics of boundary-making between disciplines and the position of geopolitics, political geography and international relations (IR). Finally we deal with geopolitical discourses proper and consider the politics of discursive struggles. The concluding section introduces the seven articles and the different ways they approach the politics of geopolitical discourse.

Address correspondence to Virginie Mamadouh, Department of Geography, Planning and International Studies, University of Amsterdam, Nieuwe Prinsengracht 130, 1018 VZ Amsterdam, The Netherlands. E-mail: v.d.mamadouh@uva.nl

THE POLITICS OF GEOPOLITICS

Geopolitics is a contentious concept – but which key concept is never discussed? Typical of geopolitics, however, is the huge gap between two approaches of international relations that use this label. In geography, geopolitics covers critical approaches to foreign policy practices and representations, while in foreign policy studies geopolitics generally refers to a conservative, realist view of international relations (IR)¹ The problem for geopolitics as academic discipline is not that there is geopolitics in the political arena, but that it is connected to a specific type of politics, German *Geopolitik* from the 1930s which is tainted by its connection with the Nazi regime.² After World War II *Geopolitik* was a shame for geographers and they empathically tried to demonstrate the neutrality of geography in general and political geography in particular. Geographical research on interstate relations carried on under these conditions has been dubbed elsewhere *non-geopolitics*³ in an attempt to underline the distance maintained between academic practice and policy recommendations for foreign policy making.

The term *geopolitics* disappeared from academic and public discourse after World War II but was progressively reclaimed from the 1970s onwards.⁴ In academia, progressive geographers like the French geographer Yves Lacoste reclaimed geopolitics for an activist and emancipatory approach to geography and politics.⁵ In international relations, realist diplomats like the American security adviser and Secretary of State (1973–1977) Henry Kissinger reclaimed geopolitics to oppose policy choices based on idealism and ideology and to bring ‘national interests’ back on the top of the agenda of foreign policy makers. Obviously such geopolitics is as much imbued with ideological assumptions as idealist foreign policies. The framing of ‘national interest’ might suggest that there is a given, general interest of a state, but the definition of such interest is always the outcome of domestic struggles and the power relations in which they are embedded. In the early 1990s, political geographers developed a new approach to geopolitics aiming to disclose geographical assumptions in geopolitical discourses, especially disclosing the politics and the power relations behind the discursive practices of intellectuals of statecraft. Like Yves Lacoste, though inspired by Michel Foucault and to a lesser extent by other French philosophers like Jacques Derrida and Jacques Baudrillard, they brought the political dimension of geopolitics, political geography, and geography to the frontline, thereby politicising it again.⁶

Still geopolitics remains ‘more political’ than many other subfields of geography – although it is not that exceptional if you compare it to advocacy and activist approaches to spatial planning and environmental preservation – and this seems to bother geographers. Two years ago the journal *Progress in Human Geography* devoted a discussion to that very question. The forum was entitled ‘Is there a politics to geopolitics?’ and was convened by Alexander Murphy⁷. It explores the political connotations of the term.

The four contributors – among whom are the two editors of *Geopolitics*: David Newman and John Agnew – address slightly different but coherent political issues. Mark Bassin⁸ first contrasts the two faces of contemporary geopolitics: the new or critical geopolitics consisting of critical approaches to foreign policy practices and representations developed by left-wing, critical or radical academics vs. the neoclassical geopolitics consisting of conservative, realist views of international relations promoted by right-wing politicians in France, Germany, Russia and the U.S.. Bassin pleads for a thorough understanding of how geopolitics is part of these ideological preoccupations. Next David Newman⁹ stresses the need for geopolitical decision-making to be better informed and the need for academics to link with practitioners. Then Paul Reuber¹⁰ argues that ‘geopolitics is taking the place of ideology’ after the Cold War following three lines of argumentation in the framing of the ‘politics of geopolitics’: the geopolitics of cultural difference (Huntington’s clash of civilisations¹¹), the geopolitics of universalism and hegemonic superpower (Fukuyama’s end of history¹²) and the geopolitics of new bloc formations (the European Union as new bloc, or Barnett’s ‘gap’¹³). According to Reuber, the deconstruction of discourses should lead to repositioning, but cannot transcend discourse. The fourth and last contributor John Agnew¹⁴ favours a more assertive attitude by geographers in claiming the term geopolitics and accepting such a struggle for concepts as the core business of academic practices; the fuzz about geopolitics precisely suggests that something interesting and challenging is happening here. He nevertheless also advances his own understanding of geopolitics that stresses the importance of framing geopolitical practices historically and posits thinking and acting ‘geopolitically’ as a key feature of modernity.

This writers forum for a broad audience of human geographers demonstrates that the political use of geopolitical insights or arguments is perceived as a major concern and challenge by geographers. At this occasion both editors of *Geopolitics* stress in their contributions the inclusive character of their journal that is portrayed as a forum open to contributions crossing the entire range of studies invoking the term geopolitics.

As the left-wing engagements of many critical geographers demonstrate, it is not politics *per se* which is deemed immoral – indeed one can argue that refraining from using academic knowledge to tackle social wrongs and change society is immoral – the point is that almost any field of knowledge that offers the prospect of manipulation, is sooner or later touched by politics. The relevant question is: can we put the political context in brackets and then still retain something conceivable as ‘advancing scientific knowledge’? In natural science many researchers have given an affirmative answer to this question, neutralising the issue of immoral applications (nuclear science) as something to be dealt with by ethical bodies. Some philosophers like Bruno Latour¹⁵ have reversed the problem by arguing that politics and social strategies are an indispensable tool in attaining

scientific results. In social and political studies the issue of an ineradicable socio-political bias in our production of academic knowledge about society has been raised continuously since the 1970s. The opinions on what constitutes a core of universal knowledge differ. In any case, since the fall of the German Nazi regime and its *Geopolitik*, the dominant conviction among geographers and political scholars has been that bracketing the politics in geopolitics would not leave anything of scientific value behind.

And is there a truth to the *new* geopolitics? The dominance of critical geopolitics and its poststructuralist focus on deconstruction have often prompted the critique that deconstructing discourse is short of what should be achieved. It doesn't necessarily provide an alternative, better framing of the social situation under scrutiny and stands aloof from policy recommendations. This is for example the critique made by Matthew Sparke¹⁶ on Ó Tuathail's *Critical Geopolitics* (1996).¹⁷ Ó Tuathail seems to share this concern as shown by his plea in a forum on the future of political geography 'to re-assert "thick" regional geographical knowledge in the face of "thin" universal theorizing about world affairs'¹⁸ and his critique on Sharp's *Condemning the Cold War*¹⁹ for being limited to deconstructing popular discourse on the Soviet threat without providing an alternative vision of communism and the Soviet Union during the Cold War.²⁰

GEOPOLITICS, IR AND POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY: DISCIPLINARY POLITICS

The debate on the politics of geopolitics has been presented above as a debate among geographers. But is geopolitics adequately described as a subfield of geography? The heritage of German *Geopolitik* has been perceived as an embarrassment for geography in general and for political geography in particular and has been dealt with by geographers among themselves. Still classical and neoclassical geopolitics and geostrategy did not completely disappear in the fields of international relations (IR), security studies and military studies, without bringing about the same process of critical redevelopment of a geopolitical research agenda. As a result of this dual path of development, the blurred identity of geopolitics is directly linked to boundary-making processes between the disciplines of political geography and international relations.

The issue is multifaceted and complicated by the uneven relations between both disciplines. In the epilogue to a collection of essays dealing with different geopolitical traditions²¹ Peter J. Taylor characterises geopolitics as the 'periphery of a periphery of a periphery'²² meaning that geopolitics is the periphery of political geography which is the periphery of geography which is the periphery of social science. By contrast, IR is a much larger field of research with a much larger crowd of researchers, allegedly higher social

status associated with diplomacy, law and political science, and better access to foreign policy makers. This might explain why the geographical debate about critical geopolitics is hardly familiar to IR scholars interested in geopolitics who instead refer either to traditional research agendas (the influence of geographical factors on foreign policy and/or international relations), or to the political usage of the word (as realist framing of international relations as power politics based on fixed national interest).

There are different ways to conceptualise the relations between geopolitics and IR. The Belgian political scientist David Criekemans has constructed a genealogical account of geopolitics as the story of a field torn between claims from political geography and from IR.²³ He criticises geographers for neglecting geopolitical approaches in IR, especially the importance of the work of Harold and Margaret Sprout²⁴ and the comparative study of foreign policies as missing link between classical and critical geopolitics. But he also argues that IR scholars neglect the geopolitical fundamentals of realism, disclosing how Hans Joachim Morgenthau, despite his own saying, was influenced by geopolitics and incorporated geopolitical factors in his assessment of national power. In his view, geopolitics is a common project for political geography and IR and he sees cognitive geopolitics (the label he uses for the work of the Sprouts) and critical geopolitics as two antitheses to classical geopolitics stemming from IR and political geography respectively.²⁵

An alternative framing is that of Klaus Dodds in which he presents political realism, liberalism and critical geopolitics as three theoretical approaches to world politics,²⁶ implicitly but effectively disregarding disciplinary boundaries while starting from a common object of study, namely world politics, defined either as political relations at the global scale or as international relations in the age of globalisation.

The present debate in IR is not only between realism and liberalism (between approaches stressing state sovereignty and those stressing international cooperation and norms), but also involves more recent cultural and constructivist approaches.²⁷ The fact that geopolitical approaches in geography form a category that does not fit into the (either/or) realist/constructivist dichotomy possibly contributes to the blurred image of geopolitics in IR. First, geographers generally do not claim to belong to a theoretical school as explicitly as IR scholars usually do. Second, geopolitical approaches can be both, depending on how they tackle the relation between geography and politics, space and power. There is indeed a fundamental gap between the two main programs of geopolitics: the one, using geographical knowledge and representation to naturalise power, belongs to the realm of realist approaches; the other, problematising the fusion of geographical knowledge and power belongs to the realm of constructivist approaches.

For IR scholars, it is customary to see geopolitics as a specific form of realist approaches, one that stresses the geographical characteristics of the state in order to explain its interests and its capabilities in entering certain international relations

in a certain way (with *Geopolitik* as emblematic, national school of geopolitics), echoing the old wisdom of great statesmen, like the French President François Mitterrand quoting Napoleon after the crumbling of the Berlin Wall: ‘Remember the words of Napoleon: Each state follows the politics of its geography’²⁸.

But critical geopolitics relates more clearly to constructivist approaches in international relations (IR), studies focusing on the formation of international and security identities and strategic culture.²⁹ The concepts used to characterise geopolitical discourses – representations, codes, visions, imaginations, and so forth (we will come back to differences between these terms in the next section) – are however broader than similar IR concepts as international identity, security identity or strategic culture, because they aim at a much larger set of representations than those customary in diplomatic and military circles. Geographers tend to underline the importance of geopolitical representations in the broader public – the soldiers to be sent to war, their families, electors that support policies and finance wars or other policy actions – and expand the study of these discourses to the realm of media and popular culture, while IR scholars generally focus on foreign policy makers, military decision makers, politicians and authors. In other words, geopolitical representations might be less sophisticated and detailed when it comes to preferences regarding the usage of certain policy instruments or tactical decisions, but they are broader in scope so as to include worldviews, perceptions and assessments of ongoing social developments in different parts of the world. Critical accounts of geopolitics in geography are also related to IR approaches that use expanded definitions of security and stress identity-related issues (for example the so-called Copenhagen School) or that focus on culture and national identity.³⁰ But despite a common research object and shared epistemological and methodological problems (How to do sound discourse analysis? How to deal with silenced voices?³¹), the exchange between these two subfields is limited.

In the IR debate, the question has been asked if culturalist approaches are meant to supplant neorealism or (only) to supplement it.³² Similarly, in a recent issue of *Geopolitics*, Kelly³³ argues for the complementarity between classic and critical geopolitics, the latter serving to refine, systematise and improve traditional geopolitics. This is not what authors writing critical geopolitics have in mind, but Kelly indeed enters the debate as a political scientist working in the traditional geopolitical approach³⁴ and brings back to the forefront the ambition to provide knowledge and insights for policy making.

THE POLITICS OF GEOPOLITICAL DISCOURSE: DISCURSIVE STRUGGLES

Studies of geopolitical discourse in geography have been stirring a large number of concepts describing these discursive practices: geopolitical

imaginings, codes, visions, narratives, representations . . . The approaches also differ in terms of the domains, scales and methodologies they choose.

In critical geopolitics, at least three domains of geopolitics are distinguished: formal geopolitics, the domain of academics and advisors, and more grand narratives; practical geopolitics, the domain of policy making and geopolitical reasoning justifying concrete foreign policy actions; and popular geopolitics, the domain of the public realm and the media that foster support and legitimacy – or fail to do so – for foreign policy. Still, according to Ó Tuathail³⁵ political geographers have neglected practical geopolitics to examine formal geopolitics³⁶ and popular geopolitics³⁷.

Another way to differentiate approaches to geopolitical discourse is the scale level they address. Ó Tuathail attempts to sort these different scales as follows.³⁸ There is the macro level of the *geopolitical imagination* linked to modernity, referring to the work of John Agnew on geopolitical structure and political economy.³⁹ The meso level of *geopolitical culture* including what he calls *geographical traditions* referring to the work of Dijkink on geopolitical visions⁴⁰ and Newman on Israeli geopolitical imaginings.⁴¹ At the meso level he distinguishes *geopolitical traditions* as competing traditions of interpreting a state's position in world affairs (p. 88) and *geopolitical visions* after Kearns' work on normative visions of world politics contrasting racial imperialism (Mackinder), liberal capitalism (Wilson), and class struggle (Lenin).⁴² Finally geopolitical discourses proper are the realm of the micro level involving geopolitical scripts and storylines in the discursive policy process.⁴³ Last but not least, Ó Tuathail introduces the term *geostrategic discourse* to characterise particular types of discourses about the 'strategic interests' of the state, these include according to him *geopolitical codes*, a concept coined by Gaddis⁴⁴ and used by Taylor⁴⁵ to characterise the map of friends and foes to evaluate places abroad in the national interest of the state. While this typology has not (yet?) been widely shared and is not likely to become so as it disregards the common meaning of two already quite established labels (geopolitical codes and geopolitical visions) it certainly helps to grasp the diversity of the geopolitical representations addressed in discursive analysis.

Another way of grasping this diversity is to underline methodological aspects: that is the actual discursive performances under scrutiny.⁴⁶ Many studies are centred on an arena (generally a national public realm) and present broad accounts of general orientations over a longer period of time. They pertain to grand narratives, national identities and broad orientations toward the rest of the world, and are often grounded in general histories of ideas, like Dijkink's account of geopolitical visions in different states.⁴⁷ Other studies are centred on specific authors and present the ideas articulated by this person in her/his writings and speeches. Generally it concerns an influential author⁴⁸ or a person in a position of power, like the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana in

Larsen's account of discourses about the role of the EU as international actor,⁴⁹ but it might also be about an outsider challenging dominant ideas, like Ó Tuathail's work on the reporting of the journalist Maggie O'Kane from Bosnia⁵⁰ or Dodds' work on the cartoons of Steve Bell.⁵¹ Yet other studies are centred on specific media channels: a set of movies like Dodds' work on James Bond⁵² or Gertz and Khleifi on Palestinian 'Roadblock Movies'⁵³, a magazine like Sharp's work on the *Readers' Digest*⁵⁴ or a comic strip like Dittmer's work on *Captain America*,⁵⁵ Web sites like Mamadouh's work on Dutch Moroccan youth after 9–11⁵⁶, and sometimes even one specific article, film, photograph or cartoon. Still others are centred on a specific event, conflict or foreign policy making decision like the genocide in Rwanda,⁵⁷ the war in Bosnia,⁵⁸ the faith of Central Europe at the end of the Cold War,⁵⁹ the protests in Seattle in 1999,⁶⁰ or the September 11 attacks.⁶¹ Finally while most study focus on discursive production, some attempt to assess discourse reception with surveys of public opinion, such as the collaborative work of Kolossov, O'Loughlin and Ó Tuathail on Russian public opinion.⁶²

A key issue in these accounts of geopolitical discourses is that of change and continuity. While the study of geopolitical representations and ideas has been introduced to liberate geopolitics from its alleged geographical determinism, the field of geopolitical representations and ideas might elicit a new kind of determinism. This is especially true of grand geopolitical narratives justifying global foreign policy orientations: Britain's aloofness to Europe, America's requirement of absolute security, the domino theory in the Cold War, Finland's mediating role between East and West. This approach is less deterministic in a pure geographical sense: it is not the insularity of Britain that explains its foreign policy but the British representation of its insularity does shape its foreign policy as it determines the opportunities and constraints policy makers are confronted with. Still this approach assigns great importance to political-geographical constellations and it does not seem to be sensitive to possible variations in vision. Geographical representations are often seen as rather stable compared to the day-to-day business of foreign policy. In their comparison of the UK, France, and Germany, Van der Wusten and Dijkink for example stress the permanent differences between the geopolitical visions of the three countries over more than a century.⁶³

Discourse studies put emphasis on human construction rather than on the environment as determinant of discourses. In Foucault's perspective discourses are explained by practices that prove to be effective in exerting power. Of course, such practice takes advantage of technological developments and physical-geographical facts. Only very powerful or hegemonic states can link geopolitical visions with an international power practice changing world order. Most other states will use geopolitical representation as a domestic justification for certain (realistic) international routines (like

colonialism, neutrality or advancing peace, bridging opposition in the world, etc.) or merely as part of a national identity strategy.

Geopolitical representations become more explicit but also more divisive when important decisions have to be taken or a crisis occurs. Major changes in the geopolitical context generally bring the reformulation of geopolitical visions, a re-articulation of geographical representations that is necessary to acknowledge and justify foreign policy changes. Recently the accession to the European Union for post communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe, the war in Afghanistan and in Iraq for Western countries, the accession to the World Trade Organization for China or Russia, all necessitate discursive justifications that encompass some renegotiation of past experiences, geopolitical visions, and national identities.

Even domestic problems like the weak national identity of an immigration country or the weak legitimacy of a ruling elite may boost the production of geopolitical images and the construction of external enemies in order to instil some pride and consensus in the masses.⁶⁴ Language (or for that matter maps) can be a force in the coercion of people, a 'representational' force that obliges people to do certain things on penalty that they lose their 'Self'. This is also valid in international conflict. Janice Mattern⁶⁵ talks about linguistic "guns" in her analysis of how 'the US and Britain forced each other into compliance with the terms of we-ness' in the Suez-crisis (p. 101). This interpretation sheds some light on the phrase 'politics of geopolitical discourse' because it reveals a curious rapprochement between the examination of software (geopolitical images and narratives) recommended by critical geopolitics and the traditional hardware approach of 'realist' international relations studies.

Whereas the founding fathers of discourse analysis would not have recoiled from using the word 'linguistic gun' (Foucault⁶⁶ elaborated discourse as a disciplining strategy in society), discourse analysis easily drifts into the analysis of texts. We are not saying that this is a condemnable type of research, but it may leave certain facts out of the picture. The main goal of text analysis is to reveal Background Knowledge or ideology,⁶⁷ that is, assumptions about the world that are never made explicit or are not advanced by author or speaker as debatable. Studies of the 'assumptive world' of certain categories of politicians, for example in suburban municipalities,⁶⁸ were an early example of deconstructing ideology in a spatial political context. Usually authors engaging in such analyses are very much aware that Background Knowledge is a power tool. Authors from the linguistic school of discourse analysis often take their examples from dialogues between authorities and subjects (for example, a police cross-examination). Yet, the analysis of texts and images with a geopolitical content may easily eclipse the political action and it is easy to see why. Unlike the everyday situation in which authority is exercised (police, school, supervision at work) the exercise of a 'representational' force on masses or in

international relations is difficult to pinpoint or visualise. There is no such thing as a clear command situation in international relations, nor can we be sure to have the right messages at our disposal.

There are several ways to tackle this problem. First it is possible to focus on different opinions about an imminent foreign policy decision. Such debates inevitably employ geopolitical images or narratives (background knowledge) and the final outcome after voting in parliament or in a council of ministers provides a cue on the representational power of such images and narratives. Second, we may look at a lingering conflict and establish how attempts at conflict resolution are thwarted by the geopolitical visions of the parties involved. Third, we may follow the evolution of a discourse in a situation of international tension where actors are enacting their 'Selves' on the international scene. All of these approaches pay attention to multiple discourses in a competitive framework.

In transitional moments, the dominant geopolitical narrative might get outdated and new ones might compete for hegemony. Considering the power relations involved in the competition between geopolitical visions, certain expectations can be formulated. Where there is a political contest of visions around an important decision, the vision that can link up with international institutional practices is more likely to win, because it can appear the more realistic and the more pragmatic and/or because it can mobilise external support. In a globalising world⁶⁹ this might be even more compelling than ever, as autarky or even self-reliance and autonomy do not seem viable alternatives. In a situation of social transformation and/or geopolitical transition, individual actors and political groups have more opportunities to change the definition of the situation. Alternative geopolitical visions have a greater chance of becoming successful. Historical background is more important than geographical location to understand the appeal or the robustness of a specific geopolitical vision in a certain country. It also determines the way geopolitical visions are articulated. Path dependency is most visible in the fact that existing and past geopolitical visions can be seen as potential resources for the formulation of new geopolitical lines of reasoning. It is not possible to predict the dominance of certain geopolitical visions because this is the outcome of a struggle between social actors. The case studies collected in this special issue are an excellent illustration of this dynamic nature of geopolitical discourses based on the interaction between politics, geography and history.

INTRODUCING THE COLLECTION OF PAPERS

Most of the papers included in this issue were presented at the Fifth Pan-European International Relations Conference of the Standing group on International relations (SGIR) of the European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR) in The Hague in September 2004 in a workshop organised

to provide a forum for an encounter between geographers and international relations scholars. Four authors are IR scholars, four are geographers. All authors keep aloof from policy recommendations and keep to the role of analysts. All papers explore the politics of geopolitical discourses at the meso level (see above) in European countries confronted with dramatic changes, in most cases the collapse of the Cold War and the post Cold War period. The papers deal with historical discontinuity and/or with competing geopolitical visions articulated by different actors at the same time. They address dominant discourses and their challengers or sequences of alternative discourses.

Most papers deal with geopolitical visions articulated for a state, although one addresses the geopolitical visions for a stateless nation – the Basque nation – and a second for the Czech nation under various political arrangements (Austrian-Hungarian Empire, Czechoslovakia, Czech Republic). Most papers consider self-representation but two put the emphasis on the representation of others: the successive geopolitical narratives of the Balkans articulated by the Greek government and the contradictory geopolitical visions of Turkey articulated by state and non-state actors in Italy. Finally three of the papers explicitly scrutinise visuals associated with the geopolitical visions they explore (the ones about the Balkans, Portugal and the Basque country respectively).

The papers fall in two broad categories when it comes to their conception of the political in geopolitical discourses. The first framework is that geopolitical reasoning (or imagining) holds a varying power of attraction over intellectuals or politicians. Some commentators on world affairs employ a geopolitical perspective; others do not. 'Geopolitical' in this context means such things as to have a realistic view on the behaviour of states and to evaluate international alliances and conflicts on the basis of location or geographical consistency rather than ideological consanguinity. The first paper considers Portuguese geopolitics contemporaneous with German *Geopolitik*. The other two consider geopolitical arguments in a setting where they are the challengers, not the dominant discourse. Although the term 'Geopolitics' remained tarnished in Germany after its reunification one could discern some fresh but hesitating seeds of 'geopolitical' judgment in public discourse after 1990. These new understandings showed more affinity with pre-war conditions than with the Cold War political landscape in Europe. In the Czech case, the paper sketches a historic alternation between geopolitical and more idealistic perspectives as articulated by key politicians at key historical moments of the political history of the Czech nation. In these two papers, geopolitical discourse is primarily associated with assuming a specific position in the foreign policy discussion. Geopolitical arguments can be quite provocative particularly in an idealistic political culture. Provocation is valued by those who want to break through 'politically correct' interpretations of the world, but a remarkable feature of the politics

of geopolitical discourse in Germany was how cautiously it had to proceed because of the emotionally charged past.

The first paper looks back to the political propaganda and the representation of territory in the colonial discourse of the Estado Novo (1933–1974), a time in which Portugal had to adjust to a minor role in world politics. As Heriberto Cairo shows in his analysis of the role of maps and propaganda in the Salazar's authoritarian regime: 'Portugal is Not a Small Country'. After analysing the famous map designed for the First Portuguese Colonial Exhibition in Porto in 1934 on which Portugal with its colonial empire is compared to European countries, Cairo considers school maps, the reception of this discourse and counter-narratives.

In *The Politics of Geopolitik in Post-Cold War Germany*, Andreas Behnke examines the expected revival of geopolitical imaginations at the end of the Cold War. He posits that the Cold War consensus to read *Geopolitik* as a Nazi science eroded at the end of the Cold War, distinguishing three approaches: one in which continuity is stressed regarding the claims of *Geopolitik*, the second rehabilitating *Geopolitik* and presenting it as a victim of Nazism, and the third a critique of *Westbindung* foreign policy and a reassessment of a new *selbstbewusste* German nation. Finally he underlines how *Geopolitik* has been marginalised in a German foreign policy based on *Verantwortungspolitik*, European Germany and *Westbindung*.

In a related endeavour, Petr Drulák examines the role of geopolitics in Czech political thought through a contrast between geopolitics and anti-geopolitics, in which the first is the foil to idealism ideology and human will, and the second a foil to geopolitics and realism. His analysis targets four central figures of Czech politics: Palacký (1798–1876), Masaryk (1850–1937), Nejedlý (1878–1962) and Havel (born 1936). His argument is that anti-geopolitics dominates, although some geopoliticians (Dvorský, Korčák) did have more influence at the time of the foundation and the destruction of Czechoslovakia in 1918 and 1938.

While these first three papers choose a more narrow view of geopolitics as a specific type of geographically informed foreign policy discourses associated with conservative, nationalist, realist ideologies, the remaining papers use a more general view: all foreign policy discourse is grounded in an understanding of a specific geographical imagination, idealist discourses denying the importance of geography being a possible version. The end of the Cold War changed things not only for countries located (partly) behind the Iron Curtain.⁷⁰ Finland was also removed from its no man's land between East and West, and Greece had to rediscover its neighbouring countries in the Balkans.

In this second framework geopolitics is not treated as a type of discourse that has extraordinary clout in a discussion with other systems of political thought, but as the ubiquitous backbone of all foreign politics. Any story of the world uses implicit geopolitical visions and images; there is no such thing as the geopolitical versus non-geopolitical position in foreign politics. This means that we are rather interested in how different structures of geopolitical thinking

and seeing are useful for politicians or movements that need to mobilise support. Here we effectively enter the domain of 'critical geopolitics'. According to the advocates of a critical approach we should deconstruct geopolitical images or narratives by showing that they are extensions of (domestic) policy aims of particular states or politicians or that they reproduce historic structures of power that have become obsolete (the state). The authors in this issue pay special attention to the volatile and diverse character of these discourses and or the normative role of frameworks other than national politics, like the international institutional reality or the international network of an actor.

Sami Moisio discusses in his article the political struggle around the Finnish accession to the European Union (1991–1994) and the competing geographies that were used to naturalise or to resist this decision. EU accession is a way of moving West,⁷¹ securing its Western identity and reframing its relations with its mighty Eastern neighbour Russia. The alternatives were isolation or Nordic integration (an option compromised by the upcoming accession of most Nordic states to the European Union).

Asteris Huliaras and Charalambos Tsardanidis contend that three geopolitical perceptions of the Balkans followed each other in the post Cold War period, influencing public opinion. First the Balkans was seen as a Muslim Arc menacing Greece. Later on, after 1995, Greek foreign policy makers developed geopolitical ambitions for their country as a regional power with the Balkans as its natural hinterland. Finally after the Kosovo war at the end of the 1990s, the Europeanisation of the Balkans became the key priority of the Greek government to stabilise the region and this process was naturalised and speeded up by consistently renaming the region South Eastern Europe.

The remaining two papers focus less on foreign policy makers and their advisors and include other political and social actors in their analyses of the struggles for geopolitical representations.

In the case of Italian views on Turkey, as earlier with the views of Greece on the Balkans, representations pertain to the other. Edoardo Boria explores the role of stereotypes and geopolitics with an analysis of the stereotype of the Turk in Italian history and its instrumentalisation by the elites. In the seventeenth century, the Republic of Venice articulated a counter-representation to that of the Roman Catholic Church. But for the present period – while the debate on the candidacy of Turkey to join the European Union is a major geopolitical issue in Italy as in most European countries – there are multiple representations. Boria introduces the representation of the Berlusconi government, the Lega Nord, the Confederation of Italian Industry, the Vatican and tour operators, and discusses the consequences of this heterogeneity for the support for Turkish accession to the European Union and in general for political action.

In his article on the Basque country, the only paper dealing with a nation without a state, Jan Mansvelt Beck considers Euskal Herria as an imagined territory. The territorial imaginations of Basqueness in Basque

nationalist rhetoric and political practice are described. On the one hand separatists generally represent Euskal Herria as a territory consisting of seven provinces (four in Spain and three historical provinces in France), but only three of them are part of the Autonomous Community of the Basque Country, the regional government with the largest degree of autonomy in Spain, which is consequently strongly institutionalised, as is the Autonomous Community of Navarra to which the Basque nationalist claims extend. Last but not least, Basques on the northern side of the international border also imagine a French Basque department for local state. In his rendering, Mansvelt Beck stresses the popular geopolitics of these territorial representations, with the concept of 'banalization of geopolitical imaginations'.

These articles are instructive case studies pertaining to smaller countries outside the realm of Anglo-American geopolitics. They do not necessarily provide ready-made solutions for the political and methodological problems examined in this introduction, but hopefully this set of articles will encourage geographers and IR scholars to engage further with the politics of geopolitical representations.

NOTES

1. M. Bassin, 'The Two Faces of Contemporary Geopolitics', *Progress in Human Geography* 285(2004) pp. 620–626.

2. Inspired by the German geographer Friedrich Ratzel (especially F. Ratzel, *Politische Geographie oder die Geographie der Staaten, des Verkehrs und des Krieges* [München: Oldenbourg 1903]) and the Swedish political scientist Rudolf Kjellén (especially R. Kjellén, *Der Staat als Lebensform* [Leipzig: S. Hirzel 1917]), the person who coined the term *Geopolitik*; the German geopolitical school developed under the leadership of Klaus Haushofer (K. Haushofer, *Geopolitik der Pan-Ideen* [Berlin: Zentral 1931]; K. Haushofer [ed.], *Macht und Erde* [Leipzig: Teubner 1932]; K. Haushofer, *Wehr-Geopolitik: Geographische Grundlagen einer Wehrkunde* [Berlin 1932] in the journal *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik* (1924–44)).

For recent assessments of *Geopolitik* see M. Bassin, 'Race Contra Space: The Conflict Between German 'Geopolitik' and National Socialism,' *Political Geography Quarterly* 6(1987) pp. 115–134; M. Bassin, 'Nature, Geopolitics and Marxism: Ecological Contestations in Weimar Germany,' *Transactions* 21(1996) pp. 315–341; K. Dodds, and D. Atkinson (eds), *Geopolitical Traditions, A Century of Geopolitical Thought* (London: Routledge 2000); M. Korinman, *Quand l'Allemagne pensait le monde; grandeur et fécondité d'une géopolitique* (Paris: Fayard 1990); G. Parker, *Geopolitics: Past, Present and Future* (London: Pinter 1998).

3. V. Mamadouh, 'Geopolitics in the Nineties: One Flag, Many Meanings,' *Geojournal* 464(1998) pp. 237–253.

4. L. W. Hepple, 'The Revival of Geopolitics,' *Political Geography Quarterly* 54 (supple)(1986) pp. s21–s36; V. Mamadouh, 'Geopolitics in the Nineties: One Flag, Many Meanings,' *Geojournal* 464(1998) pp. 237–253; V. Mamadouh, 'Reclaiming Geopolitics: Geographers Strike Back,' *Geopolitics* 41(1999) pp. 118–138.

5. Y. Lacoste, 'Enquête sur le bombardement des digues du fleuve rouge (Vietnam, été 1972). Méthode d'analyse et réflexions d'ensemble,' *Hérodote*(1) (1976); Y. Lacoste, *La géographie, ça sert, d'abord, à faire la guerre* (Paris: François Maspéro the journal *Hérodote* (1976); Y. Lacoste, (ed.), *Dictionnaire de Géopolitique* (Paris: Flammarion 1993). In English see: P. Girot and E. Kofman (eds.), *International Geopolitical Analysis, A Selection from Hérodote* (London: Croom Helm / La Découverte 1987); Paul Claval 'Hérodote and the French Left,' in K. Dodds and D. Atkinson (eds.), *Geopolitical Traditions, A Century of Geopolitical Thought* (London: Routledge 2000) pp. 239–267; Leslie W. Hepple *Géopolitiques de Gauche: Yves Lacoste, Hérodote and French Radical Geopolitics*, in K. Dodds and D. Atkinson (eds.), *Geopolitical Traditions, A Century of Geopolitical Thought* (London: Routledge 2000) pp. 268–301.

6. The emblematic book here is: G. Ó Tuathail *Critical Geopolitics, The Politics of Writing Global Space*, (London: Routledge 1996).
7. A. B. Murphy M. Bassin D. Newman P. Reuber and J. Agnew 'Is there a Politics to Geopolitics?,' *Progress in Human Geography* 28, 5 (2004) pp. 619–640.
8. M. Bassin, 'The Two Faces of Contemporary Geopolitics,' *Progress in Human Geography* 28, 5(2004) pp. 620–626.
9. D. Newman, 'An Informed and Proactive Geopolitics,' *Progress in Human Geography* 28, 5(2004) pp. 626–630.
10. P. Reuber, 'The Political Representation of Space after the Cold War and in the New Millennium,' *Progress in Human Geography* 28, 5 (2004) pp. 630–634.
11. S. Huntington, 'The Clash of Civilizations?,' *Foreign Affairs* 72(1993) pp. 22–49; S. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon and Schuster 1996).
12. F. Fukuyama, 'The End of History,' *The National Interest* 16 (1989) pp. 3–18; F. Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Free Press 1992).
13. T. P. M. Barnett, 'The Pentagon's New Map,' *Esquire* 1393(2003) pp. 174–181; T. P. M. Barnett, *The Pentagon's New Map. War and Peace in the Twenty-first Century* (New York: Penguin Books (2003)).
14. J. Agnew, 'Is 'Geopolitics' a Word that Should be Endowed only with the Meaning it Acquired in the Early Twentieth Century?,' *Progress in Human Geography* 28, 5 (2004) pp. 634–637.
15. B. Latour, *The Pasteurization of France* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1988).
16. M. Sparke, 'Graphing the Geo in Geo-political: *Critical Geopolitics* and the Re-visioning of Responsibility,' *Political Geography* 19 (2000) pp. 373–380.
17. This is also part of the feminist critique on critical geopolitics for example: L. Dowler and J. Sharp 'A Feminist Geopolitics?,' *Space & Polity* 5, 3 (2001) pp. 165–176; J. Hyndman, 'Mind the Gap: Bridging Feminist and Political Geography through Geopolitics,' *Political Geography* 23, 3(2004) pp. 307–322; M. Gilmartin and E. Kofman, 'Critically Feminist Geopolitics,' in L. A. Staeheli, E. Kofman and L. J. Peake (eds.), *Mapping Women, Making Politics; Feminist Perspectives on Political Geography* (New York: Routledge 2004) pp. 113–126; J. Sharp, 'Geography and Gender: Feminist Methodologies in Collaboration and in the Field,' *Progress in Human Geography* 29, 3 (2005) pp. 304–309.
18. G. Toal, 'Re-asserting the Regional: Political Geography and Geopolitics in World Thinly Known,' *Political Geography* 22, 6 (2003) pp. 653–655.
19. J. P. Sharp, *Condensing the Cold War, Reader's Digest and American Identity* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press 2000).
20. G. Toal, 'Condensing Critical Geopolitics: Reflections on Joanne Sharp's *Condensing the Cold War*,' *Geopolitics* 8, 2(2003) pp. 159–165.
21. K. Dodds and D. Atkinson (eds.), *Geopolitical Traditions, A Century of Geopolitical Thought* (London: Routledge 2000).
22. P. J. Taylor, 'Geopolitics, Political Geography and Social Science,' in K. Dodds and D. Atkinson (eds.), *Geopolitical Traditions. A Century of Geopolitical Thought* (London: Routledge 2000) pp. 375–379.
23. D. Crikemans, *Geopolitiek, 'Geografisch geweten' van de buitenlandse politiek? Een kritische, genealogische studie naar de eigenheid en bruikbaarheid van de geopolitieke benaderingswijze in de studie van het buitenlands beleid: PSW* (Antwerpen: Universiteit Antwerpen 2005).
24. H. Sprout and M. Sprout, *Man-milieu Relationship Hypotheses in the Context of International Politics* (Princeton, NJ: Center of International Studies 1956); H. Sprout and M. Sprout, *The Ecological Perspective on Human Affairs, with Special Reference to International Politics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1965).
25. Crikemans 2005 (see note 23) pp. 470 ff.
26. K. Dodds, *Global Geopolitics, A Critical Introduction* (Harlow: Pearson Education 2005). Especially Chapter 2: The nature of geopolitics and globalisation.
27. For a recent attempt to contrast neo-realism and strategic culture in case studies of national security strategies: J. Glenn, D. Howlett, and S. Poore (eds), *Neorealism Versus Strategic Culture* Aldershot: Ashgate 2004).
28. Quoted in *Die Zeit* 30 March 1990, quoted in G. Dijkink, *National Identity and Geopolitical Visions, Maps of Pride and Pain* (London: Routledge 1996) p. 1.
29. See for example Ó Tuathail's review of the work of David Campbell in G. Ó Tuathail, 'Dissident IR and the Identity Politics Narrative: A Sympathetically Skeptical Perspective,' *Political Geography* 15, 6–7(1996) pp. 647–653 or S. Dalby, 'Critical Geopolitics: Discourse, Difference, and Dissent,' *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 1, 1 (1991) pp. 349–363.

30. B. McSweeney, 'Identity and Security: Buzan and the Copenhagen School,' *Review of International Studies* 22, 1(1996) pp. 81–94; Y. Lapid, and F. Krotowil, *The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner 1996).

31. Compare about the gender bias of both approaches: J. P. Sharp, 'Remasculinising Geo-politics? Comments on Gearoid Ó Tuathail's *Critical Geopolitics*,' *Political Geography* 19(2000) pp. 361–364, and L. Hansen, 'The Little Mermaid's Silent Security Dilemma and the Absence of Gender in the Copenhagen School,' *Millenium* 29, 2 (2000) pp. 285–306.

32. M. C. Desch, 'Culture Clash: Assessing the Importance of Ideas in Security Studies,' *International Security* 23, 1(1998) pp. 141–170; J. S. Duffield, T. Farrell, R. Price, and M. C. Desch, 'Isms and Schisms: Culturalism Versus Realism in Security Studies,' *International Security* 24, 1 (1999) pp. 156–180.

33. P. Kelly, 'A critique of critical geopolitics,' *Geopolitics* 11, 1(2006) pp. 24–53.

34. P. Kelly, *Checkerboards and Shatterbelts: The Geopolitics of South America* (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press 1997).

35. G. Ó Tuathail, 'Theorizing Practical Geopolitical Reasoning: The Case of the United States' Response to the War in Bosnia,' *Political Geography* 21, 5 (2002) pp. 601–628.

36. For example his own seminal volume G. Ó Tuathail, *Critical Geopolitics, The Politics of Writing Global Space* (London: Routledge 1996).

37. On film, newspapers, etc., see below for details.

38. G. Ó Tuathail, 'Geopolitical Structures and Cultures: Towards Conceptual Clarity in the Critical Study of Geopolitics,' in L. Tchantouridze (ed.), *Geopolitics: Global Problems and Regional Concerns* (Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada: Centre for Defence and Security Studies 2004) pp. 75–102.

39. J. Agnew and S. Corbridge, *Mastering Space, Hegemony, Territory and International Political Economy* (London: Routledge (1995); J. A. Agnew, *Geopolitics: Re-visioning World Politics* (London/New York: Routledge 1998); J. Agnew, *Geopolitics: Re-visioning World Politics, second edition* (London/New York: Routledge 2003).

40. G. Dijkink, *National Identity and Geopolitical Visions, Maps of Pride and Pain* (London: Routledge 1996); G. Dijkink, 'Geopolitical Codes and Popular Representations,' *GeoJournal* 46, 4 (1998) pp. 397–403 (wrongly numbered 293–99).

41. David Newman, 'Citizenship, Identity and Location: The Changing Discourse of Israeli Geopolitics,' in K. Dodds, and D. Atkinson (eds), *Geopolitical Traditions, A Century of Geopolitical Thought* (London: Routledge 2000) pp. 302–331.

42. G. Kearns, 'Imperial Geopolitics, Geopolitical Visions at the Dawn of the American Century,' in J. Agnew, K. Mitchell, and G. Toal, (eds), *A Companion to Political Geography* (Oxford: Blackwell 2003) pp. 173–186. In a similar vein Roberts, Secor and Sparke speak of a neoliberal geopolitical vision in: S. Roberts, A. Secor, and M. Sparke, 'Neoliberal Geopolitics,' *Antipode* 35, 5 (2003) pp. 887–897.

43. See for example his own work on American policy making regarding the Bosnian crisis in the 1990s: G. Ó Tuathail, 'Theorizing Practical Geopolitical Reasoning: The Case of the United States' Response to the War in Bosnia,' *Political Geography* 21, 5 (2002) pp. 601–628.

44. J. L. Gaddis, *Strategies of containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press 1982).

45. P. J. Taylor, *Britain and the Cold War: 1945 as a Geopolitical Transition* (London: Pinter 1990); P. J. Taylor and C. Flint, *Political Geography, World-economy, Nation-state and Locality*, fourth edition (Harlow: Prentice Hall (Pearson) 2000).

46. Discourse analysis is often accused of lacking systematic methodologies. A recent book aiming at making explicit and justifying each step in discursive analysis is L. Hansen, *Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War* (London: Routledge 2006).

47. G. Dijkink, *National Identity and Geopolitical Visions, Maps of Pride and Pain* (London: Routledge 1996). There are many more example in chapters on national traditions in K. Dodds and D. Atkinson (eds.), *Geopolitical Traditions, A Century of Geopolitical Thought* (London: Routledge 2000). This collection also features examples of other approaches.

48. For a set of such analyses: G. Ó Tuathail, 'Putting Mackinder in his Place; Material Transformations and Myth,' *Political Geography* 11, 1(1992) pp. 100–118; G. Ó Tuathail, *Critical Geopolitics, The Politics of Writing Global Space* (London: Routledge. But also dealing with the work of Pentagon adviser Thomas Barnett: S. Roberts, A. Secor and M. Sparke, 1996). 'Neoliberal Geopolitics,' *Antipode* 35, 5 (2003) pp. 887–897.

49. H. Larsen, 'The EU: A Global Military Actor?,' *Cooperation and Conflict* 37, 3 (2002) pp. 283–302.

50. G. Ó Tuathail, 'An Anti-geopolitical Eye: Maggie O'Kane in Bosnia, 1992–93,' *Gender, Place and Culture* 3, 2(1996) pp. 171–185. For the notion of anti-geopolitics see P. Routledge, 'Anti-geopolitics,' in G. Ó Tuathail, S. Dalby and P. Routledge (eds.), *The Geopolitics Reader* (London: Routledge 1998) pp. 245–255 (second edition 2006).

51. K. Dodds, 'The 1982 Falklands War and a Critical Geopolitical Eye: Steve Bell and the If . . . Cartoons,' *Political Geography* 15, 6–7 (1996) pp. 571–592.

52. K. Dodds, 'Licensed to Stereotype: Popular Geopolitics, James Bond and the Spectre of Balkanism,' *Geopolitics* 8, 2(2003) pp. 125–156; K. Dodds, 'Screening Geopolitics: James Bond and the Early Cold War Films (1962–1967),' *Geopolitics* 10, 2(2005) pp. 266–289.

53. N. Gertz and G. Khleifi, 'Palestinian 'Roadblock' movies,' *Geopolitics* 10(2005) pp. 316–334. More on films in the special issue edited by Marcus Power and Andrew Crampton 2005 for *Geopolitics* 10, 2 with articles devoted to certain genres or specific films, see also on *Black Hawk Down* S. Carter, and D. P. McCormack, 'Film, Geopolitics and the Affective Logics of Intervention,' *Political Geography* 25, 2 (2006) pp. 225–245.

54. J. P. Sharp, 'Publishing American Identity: Popular Geopolitics, Myth and *The Reader's Digest*,' *Political Geography* 1, 2 (1993); J. P. Sharp, 'Hegemony, Popular Culture and Geopolitics: The Reader's Digest and the Construction of Danger,' *Political Geography* 15, 6–7 (1996) pp. 557–570; J. P. Sharp, *Condensing the Cold War, Reader's Digest and American Identity* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 2000).

55. J. Dittmer, 'Captain America's Empire: Reflections on Identity, Popular Culture, and Post-9/11 Geopolitics,' *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 95, 3 (2005) pp. 626–643.

56. V. Mamadouh, '11 September and Popular Geopolitics: A Study of Websites Run for and by Dutch Moroccans,' *Geopolitics* 8, 3 (2003) pp. 191–216.

57. G. Myers, T. Klak and T. Koehl, 'The Inscription of Difference: News Coverage of the Conflicts in Rwanda and Bosnia,' *Political Geography* 15, 1 (1996) pp. 21–46.

58. G. Ó Tuathail, 'Theorizing Practical Geopolitical Reasoning: The Case of the United States' Response to the War in Bosnia,' *Political Geography* 21, 5 (2002) pp. 601–628.

59. J. O'Loughlin, 'Geopolitical Visions of Central Europe,' in M. Antonsich, V. Kolossov and P. Pagnini (eds.), *Europe between Geopolitics and Political Geography* (Rome: Societa Geografica Italiana (2001) pp. 601–628.

60. T. McFarlane, and I. Hay, 'The Battle for Seattle: Protest and Popular Geopolitics in The Australian Newspaper,' *Political Geography* 22, 2 (2003) pp. 211–232. See also P. Routledge, 'Going Globale: Spatiality, Embodiment, and Media-tion in the Zapatista Insurgency,' in G. Ó Tuathail, S. Dalby, (eds.), *Rethinking Geopolitics* (Routledge, London/New York 1998) pp. 240–260; P. Routledge, and 'Our Resistance Will be as Transnational as Capital': Convergence space and strategy in globalising resistance,' *GeoJournal* 52 (2000) pp. 25–33; P. Routledge, 'Convergence Space: Process Geographies of Grassroots Globalization Networks,' *Transactions* 28, 3 (2003) pp. 333–349.

61. P. C. Adams, 'The September 11 Attacks as Viewed from Quebec: The Small-nation Code in Geopolitical Discourse,' *Political Geography* 23, 6 (2004) pp. 765–795.

62. J. O'Loughlin, G. Ó Tuathail and V. Kolossov, 'A. 'Risky Westward Turn'? Putin's 9–11 Script and Ordinary Russians,' *Europe-Asia Studies* 56, 1 (2004) pp. 3–34; J. O'Loughlin, G. Ó Tuathail, and V. Kolossov, 'Russian Geopolitical Storylines and Public Opinion in the Wake of 9–11: A Critical Geopolitical Analysis and National survey,' *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 37, 4 (2004) pp. 281–318; J. O'Loughlin, G. Ó Tuathail, and V. Kolossov, 'Russian Geopolitical Culture and Public Opinion: The Masks of Proteus Revisited,' *Transactions* 30, 3 (2005) pp. 322–335.

63. H. Van der Wusten, and G. Dijkink, 'German, British and French Geopolitics: The Enduring Differences,' *Geopolitics* 7, 3 (2002) pp. 19–38.

64. D. Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1992); G. Dijkink, *National Identity and Geopolitical Visions, Maps of Pride and Pain* (London: Routledge 1996); G. Dijkink, 'Geopolitical Codes and Popular Representations,' *GeoJournal* 46, 4 (1998) pp. 397–403 (wrongly numbered 293–99).

65. J. B. Mattern, *Ordering International Politics: Identity, Crisis, and Representational Force* (New York: Routledge 2005). See also Lothar Brock's book review in this issue.

66. M. Foucault, *Discipline and Punish* (London: Allen Lane 1977).

67. N. L. Fairclough, 'Critical and Descriptive Goals in Discourse Analysis,' *Journal of Pragmatics* 9, 6 (1985) pp. 739–763.

68. K. Young, and Kramer, 'Local Exclusionary Politics in Britain: The Case of Suburban Defense in a Metropolitan System,' in K. R. Cox (ed.), *Urbanization and Conflict in Market Societies* (London: Methuen 1978) pp. 229–249.

69. Globalisation is itself evidently a powerful geopolitical representation.

70. or the kidnapped west, as Kundera stated for Czechoslovakia in the 1980s. See Milan Kundera, 'The tragedy of Central Europe', *New York Review of Books* (26 April 1984) pp. 33–8. (The article was first published in French under the title 'Un Occident kidnappé ou la tragédie de l'Europe centrale' *Le Débat*, no. 27 (november 1983).

71. See also C. S. Browning, 'Coming Home or Moving Home? 'Westernizing' Narratives in Finnish Foreign Policy and the Reinterpretation of Past Identities,' *Cooperation and Conflict* 37, 1 (2002) pp. 47–72.