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## Religion and Geopolitics

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Religion is the emerging political language of the time.<sup>1</sup> In the Middle East and the United States this is particularly clear, but it is also apparent throughout much of what we used to call the Third World. All over Africa, for example, a popular religiosity is everywhere visible in the noonday ritual in Muslim areas of praying men in the streets and the proliferation of Pentecostal and other churches elsewhere. In Latin America as well, Protestant evangelicals, Pentecostals, and Mormons have all experienced tremendous success in evangelising indigenous peoples alienated from the Catholic Church and its alliance with the high and mighty.<sup>2</sup> If the failure of development to deliver promised material benefits is one source of this “return” to religion (even if Pentecostalism’s appeal lies in part in its promise of divine help in that department), another has surely been the incredibly rapid replacement of the Cold War’s ideological warfare by the religious calls to battle from *al-Qaeda* and the George W. Bush White House. When they insist that the world is either for them or against them in a cosmic struggle between good and evil, they risk having all social and political conflicts everywhere redefined in such religious terms.

Of course, this rhetorical idiom can be seen as simply a shield for “deeper” or more profound conflicts of interest over economic and political power, such as who should control the world oil supply or who should rule in the Arab world. This sort of thinking, though popular among many academics and journalists, is deeply misleading. The connections between religious thought and language, on the one hand, and material interests, on the other, depend on interpenetration or metabolising between them rather than an efficient causality subordinating one to the other. As has been remarked of the seemingly strange alliance in US politics between “cowboy capitalism” (represented best of all, perhaps, by Vice President Dick Cheney) and “evangelical Christianity” (represented by a stream of TV preachers and local pastors), brought together in the person of George W. Bush, what they

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share in common and what gives them a shared set of sensibilities about a wide range of issues is “the insistence by its members that they are being persecuted *unless* they are thoroughly in power, and the compensatory sense of a special entitlement that accompanies the rise to power of a constituency that so construes itself.”<sup>3</sup>

This alliance is only possible, however, because the evangelicals (more particularly those subscribing to specific “fundamentalist” or “literalist” readings of the Bible) subscribe to a set of religious doctrines that, while distinctive from those of cowboy (or rentier) capitalism, tend to share definite points of affinity and sensibility with them. Perhaps the most important is the shared mythology of “Americanism;” most significantly the “frontier experience” of personal mobility overcoming natural adversity that has undergone something of a renaissance in the aftermath of the critiques of the traditional American story that blossomed in the late 1960s and early 1970s.<sup>4</sup> The cutting edge of American fundamentalist Christianity is not the Social Gospel of Jesus, giving priority to the parables or maxims of Jesus as guidance to daily life and in relationships with others.<sup>5</sup> It is, rather, as William Connolly has noted, “organized around a vision of the Second Coming, dramatized in the best-selling series of novels, *Left Behind*. The series has sold more than 50 million copies to date. In the first novel, itself entitled *Left Behind*, millions of born-again Christians around the world are lifted suddenly to heaven during the Rapture. The rest of humanity is ‘left behind.’”<sup>6</sup> In the aftermath, according to this pre-millennial story, a war erupts between the followers of an Antichrist whose blandishments are resisted only by the nick-in-time arrival of a late-believing Tribulation Force. In the end, on the Day-of-Judgment, Christ hurtles all non-believers (particularly believers in other religions) into everlasting hellfire. This apocalyptic reading of the Christian Bible, based on giving the Christ of Revelation a substantial precedence over the Jesus of Luke, has long been characteristic of the Christian millenarianism that has periodically re-emerged during times of radical change in European and American society.<sup>7</sup>

This vision obviously envisages anything but a peaceful world as biblical prophecy comes to pass, so why bother with negotiations or the other tedious and anti-scriptural (in this rendering) practices of domestic and international politics? Democracy, in the sense of relatively open, competitive politics under the rule of law, is so obviously lacking in righteousness in such circumstances, so why pursue it in Iraq or anywhere else? In many respects the typical fundamentalist reading of the Bible is a revenge fantasy directed more towards designating enemies destined for perdition than opening up the possibility of universal salvation. In a more positive vein, however, it can be read as the translation of the Chosen People motif into a voluntarist refrain in which, like other American consumers, you get to choose whether or not to be saved (now both figuratively and literally). “Democracy” then becomes access to the possibility of conversion into “the

American Way,” more especially its apocalyptic promise. Even a cursory reading of the Christian gospels gives a clear sense that all people are potentially worthy of salvation.<sup>8</sup> But the fundamentalist ontology of salvation ultimately makes that impossible: without the damned there cannot be the saved. More particularly, however, in relation to the resonance between capitalism and evangelicalism, there is a confluence between the suspicion believers are encouraged to develop by their pastors for those preparing the ground for the Antichrist’s future sponsorship of humanist initiatives to “improve” society (particularly if these involve spending tax revenues on wanton sinners) and the urge to convert sinners, on the one hand, and cowboy capitalism’s desire to direct government into the paths of economic righteousness (lower corporate taxes, an end to estate taxes, increased federal spending on military hardware, outsourcing of government programs, etc.), on the other.<sup>9</sup>

What is important to emphasise here is that in times past most American millennial cults, and those cropping up, if with a different eschatology, elsewhere, were politically marginal.<sup>10</sup> This is not true today. When President Bush talks about “the axis of evil” his phrase is taken literally by a group whose political importance in the US goes well beyond their numbers. He is speaking to and with what his advisor Karl Rove calls “the base” of the contemporary Republican Party, the party that currently controls all of the major national institutions of government in the United States.<sup>11</sup> The rise of the Republican Party from its nadir of popular support in the 1960s owes much to the active recruitment of conservative groups previously marginal to national politics and to those elements resentful of the social changes introduced by Democratic administrations, particularly the expansion of civil rights and welfare spending. Still, if the end is truly nigh, policy of any kind might seem rather pointless. Of course, and chillingly, if agency more than fate lies behind the Apocalypse, then the connection between apocalyptic vision and US military power may lead to self-fulfilling rather than biblical prophecy.

Religion and geopolitics have always had ties of one sort or another. Much nationalism and imperialism have found purpose and justification in religious differences and in proselytising.<sup>12</sup> As the modern European nation-states came into existence in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, religious zealotry was both cause and consequence of the concentration of state power and the rivalries between the states. In England, the tensions that characterised the Protestant Elizabeth I’s reign culminated in the melodramatic attempt by Catholic activists (with Spanish and French connections) – whose main operative was Guy Fawkes – to blow up her successor, James I, and the assembled houses of lords and commons in the Palace of Westminster in London. This was the Gunpowder Plot of 1605, still commemorated every November 5, though most people today probably have little idea of the original event or understand the avowedly anti-Catholic

flavor of the observance.<sup>13</sup> Russian, Spanish, French, Dutch, British, and American imperialism has also always found some logic in the conversion of natives or in the use of religious differences to explain why others should be subjugated.

Amongst the apocalyptic mayhem of the *Left Behind* books there is a not-too-hidden geopolitical agenda, reflecting the long-term tendency of millennialism to adopt a geopolitical expression in terms of *where* evil lurks and *where* the forces of righteousness will finally come into conflict with the Antichrist and his servants. Unsurprisingly, the UN (albeit a largely American invention) is the Antichrist's vehicle for power. All international agencies and supra-national currencies are the Devil's works. As the kings of the earth "give their power and strength unto the beast" (Revelation 17:13), the Whore of Babylon now sits upon "seven mountains" (Revelation 17:9). Rome has seven hills. The Treaty of Rome was the founding document of the European Union. Ipso facto, the EU is the Devil's work. Even global warming may serve a Divine purpose by its hastening of the melting of the polar icecaps that, in this account, will be an important part of the Tribulation. Parenthetically, what is ultimately divine and what is ultimately Satanic in all of this is a matter of interpretation. Finally, the ultimate showdown, Armageddon, will occur, not surprisingly, given the authorship of the Bible, in Israel, when the Jews have established a state for themselves. This is necessary before Christ can return in his splendour. Now, it may all be quite a stretch to connect such disparate places and events in a contemporary narrative drawn from a two-thousand year old story written shortly after the fall of Jerusalem to a Roman army in 70 AD, but you can see where the authors are going with this. They are providing nothing less than a Bible-based geopolitics for US policy on a wide range of issues, from taking sides in the Israel-Palestine conflict and doing nothing about global warming to the obviously diabolical meaning of the terror attacks of September 11 2001.<sup>14</sup> What is more: they have no doubt. Doubt is for softies and unbelievers.<sup>15</sup>

Not all types of religious geopolitics rely on such tortuous textual exegesis. In many cases there is simply a claim to a territory based on a religious justification or a grant from God. Such is the case with the *al-Qaeda* desire to violently re-establish an Islamic *umma* (community of believers) separate from the social pollution of the infidels.<sup>16</sup> This was somewhat pre-figured in Iran's Ayatollah Khomeini's designation of the United States as "the Great Satan" at the time of the overthrow of the Shah in 1979. Various groups claiming Islamic credentials, such as the murderous *janjawiid* militia in Darfur, Sudan, adhere to derivative creeds, including the notion that only the lineal descendants of the Prophet Muhammed and his *Qoreish* tribe are entitled to rule Muslim lands.<sup>17</sup> In the end, though, as the legal scholar Khaled Abou El-Fadl puts it: "The holy cities of Mecca, Medina, and Jerusalem are at the very heart of any Islamic territorial claim. However, beyond the holy sites, it seems to me that every other territorial boundary is secondary in importance

to the universal moral imperative of *Shari'ah* [Islamic law].<sup>18</sup> The problem is that in classical Islamic law Muslims were not expected to live permanently among non-Muslims. Indeed, they were expected to emigrate into the *dar-al-islam* (or Islamic lands).<sup>19</sup> Consequently, cohabitation with non-Muslims in the same territory becomes a major dilemma in such terms. In the case of Judaism, there is also some dispute over the centrality of land to Jewish identity and religious practice, with obvious implications for both Zionism and the possibility of exchanging “land for peace” in the conflict with Palestinians. If, for example, the *holy* land of Israel is central to Judaism for Menachem Lorberbaum (“The land originally promised to Abraham [by God]”), to Daniel Statman the land of Israel is not intrinsically holy at all; indeed, “According to the Biblical text, the good earth as encountered by the Israelites is more of an obstacle to a life of holiness [because of its richness] than an inspiration to one.”<sup>20</sup>

In yet other cases, such as Hinduism and Confucianism, where there is no single text such as the Bible, the Torah or the Koran from which to draw geopolitical inspiration, there can nevertheless be decidedly geopolitical implications for religious thought, broadly construed. Imagining a distinctive “Hindudom,” for example has become an important element of Hindu nationalism in India, represented by a range of affiliated movements, not the least of which is the BJP political party. In competition with the hitherto dominant secular Indian state, this nationalism proclaims a Greater India defined with explicit reference to Hindu lore in which India is an “ancient country whose natural borders ran from the Indus to the Eastern Sea, and from the Himalayas (including Kashmir, of course) to Kanyakumari.”<sup>21</sup> Equally naturally, this Hindu nationalism renders Muslims in India, the world’s second largest such population (after Indonesia), as “Muslim Hindus;” mapping India in “exclusively Hindu terms, through rituals of migration and pilgrimage and a litany of sacred sites and rivers. It is a cartography of loathing and desire, in roughly equal parts.”<sup>22</sup> In counterpoint, Confucianism, in both classic and postcolonial manifestations, exhibits little of this territorial specificity. Scaled up from the Confucian household, the Chinese emperor (or China *per se*) “presided as the Celestial Parent with all Others as its filial children or younger siblings.”<sup>23</sup> Presuming that all others could be brought to adopt the Confucian world-order, “No absolute outside was acknowledged, only relative degrees of proximity to a center.”<sup>24</sup> Thus, in this understanding of Confucianism, unity is valued above all else. In an ideal world the “moral power” of a sage ruler would “eventually attract those living in faraway lands, bringing peace to the whole world and presumably doing away with the need for territorial boundaries between states.”<sup>25</sup> Whether this hegemonic calculus has much of anything to do with contemporary Chinese geopolitics or that of East Asia more generally is an open question.

Notwithstanding the geopolitical implications present in these other cases, it is Christianity and Islam, the world’s great missionary religions, that

provide the most vivid case for the rise of religion as the *geopolitical* idiom of the time.<sup>26</sup> It is the use of their founding texts as utopian templates that gives the fundamentalists the particular source of authority upon which their geopolitical claims rest. At the same time, the everyday utopianism of the sort identified by Russell Jacoby, iconoclastic in its resistance to detailed blueprints yet inspirational in its desire for a better life, has gone into a spiral of decline.<sup>27</sup> Into the vacuum has moved a religious utopianism based on drawing rigorous boundaries between insiders and outsiders. This feeds into the “clash of civilizations” scenario laid out by Samuel Huntington but which is in itself a direct intellectual reaction to the rise of Christian and Islamic fundamentalisms.<sup>28</sup>

In this special issue we cannot hope to cover all of the aspects of the contemporary relationship between religion and geopolitics. The idea of the special issue is as much to stimulate interest in and research on the linkage between religion and geopolitics as to publish definitive studies on the theme. All of the papers included herein were presented in response to a call for papers made in 2004. They have all been submitted to peer review in conformity with the policy of this journal.

The issue begins with an article by Gertjan Dijkink that provides a general theoretical framework for those that follow. In relating current interest in religion among scholars of geopolitics to the focus on the “mind” in so-called critical geopolitics, he also points to some of the older roots of the connections between religion and geography in the writings of J. K. Wright and Yi-Fu Tuan. Dijkink focuses specifically on the historical importance of holy land, holy war, and millennialism as conjunctures between religion and geopolitics that have recurred throughout modern history. Valuably, Dijkink suggests that we should be careful not to see the religion to geopolitics relationship as a necessary one. It is a historically and geographically contingent one in which geopolitics based on other grounds is sometimes given a religious veneer.

The second paper, by Iain Wallace, focuses specifically on the relationships between God and territory in the Christian Scriptures and how these have been selectively appropriated by various “Christian” nations, particularly the United States, to inspire and justify geopolitical claims. Tristan Sturm’s paper takes up one particular example of this appropriation in an analysis of the prophetic writings of one American Christian fundamentalist evangelist, Mark Hitchcock. Hitchcock’s premillennialism is avowedly geopolitical in its emphasis on using Bible prophecy to transform “geography into eschatology.” A distinctive brand of American religiosity, by definition American in its historical origins and elements of its theology, is Mormonism. In their paper, Ethan Yorgason and Dale Robertson trace the rise and fall of a distinctively Mormon geopolitical vision as Mormons shifted from quintessential outsiders to favored insiders within American society. Nevertheless, they detect a persisting distinctiveness to Mormon prophetic geopolitics,

not least in its recent emulation of a Catholic model of relations to the world at large, even as it has become complicit with the larger conservative trend in US national politics.

Of course, Mormonism is but one example of a religion that had geopolitical implications associated with it from the start. Religious impulses have long inspired movements for social and political change, both peaceful and violent. One such movement, that of the Turkish Muslim reformer Fethullah Güllen, is the subject of the fifth article by Jeff West. Though critical of Osama Bin Laden and other “Muslim” terrorists and oriented to Turkey as a “model” state, Güllen is sympathetic to the idea that religious identity should be the “prime mover” in achieving social and political identity. This leads to a “dissident” geopolitics that plays down the role of the state-system even as it aspires to achieve a “unified mosaic” of religiously inspired nations. The final two papers address the role of religion in the creation and maintenance of two particular “nation-states.” The first, by Cathelijne de Busser, examines the symbiosis in Spain in the latter half of the twentieth century between a centralising state, on the one hand, and the Catholic cult of an annual offering to St. James, on the other, even as Spain’s relative political autonomy shifted and strained under external influences. The second, by Dmitrii Sidorov, deals with the contemporary revival in Russia of an explicitly Russian Orthodox geopolitical metaphor: Russia as the “Third Rome” or successor to the Roman and Byzantine empires. In distinguishing the various “currents” of thought associated with this idea, Sidorov shows that this idea, by no means a new one, serves at least to justify a return to the territorial status quo ante the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 and at most to claim new areas for Russian expansionism. Religious justification for imperialism is by no means a dead letter.

## NOTES

1. See, for example, Steve Bruce, *Politics and Religion* (Cambridge: Polity Press 2003); and Fabio Petito and Pavlos Hatzopoulos (eds), *Religion in International Relations: The Return from Exile* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2003).

2. For example, see Laurent Tranier, ‘Les Indigènes Équatoriens Face au Défi Évangélique’, *Le Monde Diplomatique* (april 2005) pp. 18–19.

3. William E. Connolly, ‘The Evangelical-Capitalist Resonance Machine’, *Political Theory* 33, 6 (2005) p. 873. Connolly emphasises the role in the United States of right-wing talk radio, Fox News, and Internet bloggers in facilitating the resonance between the two sides of the alliance even as he notes the tensions that inevitably afflict such an unstable partnership.

4. On the United States of America as ‘the Promised Land’ see, for example, John Agnew, *Hegemony: The New Shape of Global Power* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press 2005) p. 96.

5. Bill McKibben, ‘The Christian Paradox: How a Faithful Nation Gets Jesus Wrong’, *Harper’s Magazine* (August 2005) pp. 31–37, notes how when the self-guidance element of the Bible is emphasised among American Christians it tends to turn into a self-help program. For example, the best-selling ‘Christian’ book *The Purpose-Driven Life* has ‘all the hallmarks of self-absorption’ (p. 37). As McKibben also reports (p. 31) fully three-quarters of Americans surveyed report that the Bible teaches: ‘God helps those who help themselves,’ when this was a remark made by Ben Franklin, and ‘Few ideas could be further from the gospel message, with its radical summons to love of neighbor.’



6. William E. Connolly (note 3) p. 874.

7. For the history of Christian millennialism see, in particular, Norman Cohn, *The Pursuit of the Millennium: Revolutionary Millenarians and Mystical Anarchists of the Middle Ages*, expanded ed. (New York: Oxford University Press 1970); and Michael Barkun, *Disaster and the Millennium* (Syracuse NY: Syracuse University Press, 1974). On Messianic cults and fundamentalisms more generally, see, for example, Vittorio Lanternari, *The Religions of the Oppressed: A Study of Modern Messianic Cults* (London: MacGibbon and Kee 1963); Peter Worsley, *The Trumpet Shall Sound: A Study of 'Cargo' Cults in Melanesia* (London: Paladin 1957); and Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby (eds), *The Fundamentalism Project, Volumes 1-4* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1991-1993)

8. Michael Northcott, *An Angel Directs the Storm: Apocalyptic Religion and American Empire* (London: I.B. Tauris 2004) p. 123, in answering the question of Christianity, 'How did a pacifist religion become a religion of holy war?' suggests that much of it had to do with its becoming the official religion of the Roman Empire. It was then that a Chosen People refrain (inherited from Judaism) was conjoined with the Roman fusion of religion with state politics.

9. Of course, American Christianity on the whole (and certainly Christianity in general) should not be confused with this particular variety. At one time, indeed, evangelical Protestantism itself was a major force for progressive politics in the country, as it has been elsewhere. Although for much of the twentieth century this same creed also provided ready religious justification for US military interventions around the world (on this, see, for example, Richard M. Gamble, *The War for Righteousness: Progressive Christianity, the Great War, and the Rise of the Messianic Nation* [New York: ISI Books 2004]), there is still considerable doctrinal and political variety. For example, the Reverend Billy Graham, the most famous living US Christian evangelist, emphasises the model of Jesus for the Christian life and, inter alia, expresses concern that global warming should be addressed as part of humanity's 'stewardship' of the earth. His son, Franklin, however, represents a much more dogmatic fundamentalism that is, perhaps, a better reflection of the times among many American evangelical Christians than is the theology of his father (Peter J. Boyer, 'The Big Tent: Billy Graham, Franklin Graham, and the Transformation of American Evangelicalism', *The New Yorker* (22 August 2005) pp. 42-55).

10. Although a case can be made for a longer running influence of certain Biblical interpretations on British and US foreign policies in the Middle East. 'Christian Zionism,' for example, is neither a new phenomenon in its insistence on Jewish control of the Holy Land in advance of the Second Coming of Christ nor without previous political influence on, for example, the famous Balfour Declaration of 1917. On this topic see Irvine H. Anderson, *Biblical Interpretation and Middle East Policy: The Promised Land, America, and Israel, 1917-2002* (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida 2005). Of course, the obvious question to ask is whether short-run 'friends' like these are not really long-run enemies?

11. This not to say that Christian fundamentalists are directly running the US government, only that they constitute a significant force in the coalition that now holds a monopoly of power' and that 'One is foolish to think that their bizarre ideas do not matter' (Bill Moyers, 'Welcome to Domsday', *The New York Review of Books* (24 March 2005) p. 10.) Together with right-wing Catholic allies on a wide range of social issues (abortion, etc.), however, their presence in the halls of power indicates how much US government is now dominated by mobilised fringe elements in the presence of majoritarian indifference to their crucial role in contemporary Washington DC (Garry Wills, 'Fringe Government', *The New York Review of Books* (6 October 2005) pp. 46-50.) Fervent minorities not only undermine unpopular absolutist regimes, as the Bolsheviks did in Tsarist Russia, but can also sabotage democratically fragile republics such as the United States when political institutions are easily subverted by moneyed interests and when electoral participation is low (see Agnew, *Hegemony* [note 4] ch. 5).

12. On some of the complexities involved, see, for example, John Agnew, 'Nationalism,' in James S. Duncan, Nuala Johnson, and Richard Schein (eds), *A Companion to Cultural Geography* (Oxford: Blackwell 2004).

13. Alice Hogge, *God's Secret Agents: Queen Elizabeth's Forbidden Priests and the Hatching of the Gunpowder Plot* (London: HarperCollins 2005); and James Travers, *Gunpowder: The Players behind the Plot* (London: The National Archives 2005).

14. See, for a recent good example of the genre, Michael D. Evans, *The American Prophecies: Ancient Scriptures Reveal our Nation's Future* (New York: Time Warner 2004). Quite why God should favour the rich and powerful Americans when the Jesus of the gospels, for one, always tended to side with the poor and downtrodden, is never explained. It is perhaps no coincidence that American fundamentalists are very taken with the C. S. Lewis *Chronicles of Narnia* (notwithstanding their departure from Biblical literalism) where the stand-in for Jesus is Aslan, a lion, rather than say, for example, the animals

most favoured by Jesus: the lamb and the donkey. As Adam Gopnik has noted (in 'Prisoner of Narnia: How C.S. Lewis Escaped', *The New Yorker* [21 November 2005] p. 92), 'The moral force of the Christian story is that the lions are all on the other side.'

15. Pollster Daniel Yankelovich, 'Poll Positions: What Americans Really Think about U.S. Foreign Policy', *Foreign Affairs* (September/October 2005) p. 10, claims that at least for now a sizeable chunk of the US population accepts extreme apocalyptic views: 'In the minds of white evangelical Protestants, the nation is faced with an apocalyptic threat.'

16. For a review of the range of attempts at such a Muslim 'geopolitics', see, in particular, Peter Mandaville, *Transnational Moslem Politics: Reimagining the Umma* (London: Routledge 2001); and, for some of the inspiration, David Cook, *Contemporary Muslim Apocalyptic Literature* (Syracuse NY: Syracuse University Press 2005). The particular attraction of Muslims in Western countries to millennial Islam is addressed in Pnina Werbner, 'The Predicament of Diaspora and Millennial Islam', *Ethnicities* 4 (2004) pp. 451–76. For a fascinating discussion of the Koranic and other roots of the Muslim concept of *umma* and affiliated terms see Sohail H. Hashmi, 'Political Boundaries and Moral Communities: Islamic Perspectives,' in Allen Buchanan and Margaret Moore (eds), *States, Nations, and Borders: The Ethics of Making Boundaries* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2003) pp. 181–213.

17. Alex de Waal, 'Chasing Ghosts: The Rise and Fall of Militant Islam in the Horn of Africa', *London Review of Books* (18 August 2005) p. 8.

18. Khaled Abou El-Fadl, 'The Unbounded Law of God and Territorial Boundaries,' in Allen Buchanan and Margaret Moore (eds), *States, Nations, and Borders: The Ethics of Making Boundaries* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2003) p. 226.

19. Rainer Brunner, 'Forms of Muslim Self-Perception in European Islam.' *Hagar: Studies in Culture, Polity, Identities* 6, 1 (2005) pp. 75–76.

20. Menachem Lorberbaum, 'Making and Unmaking the Boundaries of Holy Land,' in Allen Buchanan and Margaret Moore (eds), *States, Nations, and Borders: The Ethics of Making Boundaries* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2003) p. 23; Daniel Statman, 'Man-Made Boundaries and Man-Made Holiness in the Jewish Tradition,' in Allen Buchanan and Margaret Moore (eds) *States, Nations, and Borders: The Ethics of Making Boundaries* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2003) p. 42. Perhaps the most brilliant exploration of the consequences of the 'prison of roots,' for Jews in particular but also for everyone in general, is Jean Daniel, *The Jewish Prison: A Rebellious Meditation on the State of Judaism*, translated from the French by Charlotte Mandell (New York: Melville House 2005).

21. Stuart E. Corbridge, 'Cartographies of Loathing and Desire: The Bharatiya Janata Party, the Bomb, and the Political Spaces of Hindu Nationalism,' in Yale H. Ferguson and R. J. Barry Jones (eds), *Political Space: Frontiers of Change and Governance in a Globalizing World* (Albany, NY: SUNY Press 2002) p. 157.

22. Corbridge (note 21) p. 159.

23. Lily H. M. Ling, 'Borders of Our Minds: Territories, Boundaries, and Power in the Confucian Tradition,' in Allen Buchanan and Margaret Moore (eds), *States, Nations, and Borders: The Ethics of Making Boundaries* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2003) p. 88.

24. J. L. Hevia, *Cherishing Men from Afar: Qing Guest Ritual and the Macartney Embassy of 1793* (Durham NC: Duke University Press) p. 23, quoted in Ling (note 23) p. 88.

25. Daniel Bell, 'The Making and Unmaking of Boundaries: A Contemporary Confucian Perspective,' in Allen Buchanan and Margaret Moore (eds), *States, Nations, and Borders: The Ethics of Making Boundaries* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2003) p. 59.

26. See, for example, John D. Carlson and Erik C. Owens (eds), *The Sacred and the Sovereign: Religion and International Politics* (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press 2003).

27. Russell Jacoby, *Picture Imperfect: Utopian Thought for an Anti-Utopian Age* (New York: Columbia University Press 2005). More generally on utopian thought and practice, see Krishan Kumar, *Utopianism* (Milton Keynes: Open University Press 1991).

28. Samuel Huntington, 'The Clash of Civilizations?' *Foreign Affairs* 72 (1993) pp. 22–49.